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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic Factors Led To The Fall Of Jin Dynasty: 
Focus On The Economic Effects After Relocation Of Capital To Kaifeng 
by 
WONG Ming Hong 
Master of Philosophy 
 
This thesis traces ramifications of the relocation of the Imperial Capital during the 
Jin dynasty. It argues the decline and fall of the Jin is rooted in this relocation. In 
1209-1213 C.E., faced with the Mongol military threat and a dire shortage of grains, 
the Jin dynasty (1115-1234) was forced to relocate its capital from Zhongdu to 
Nanjing (Kaifeng). The sudden move, however, crippled effective governance in the 
former capital and its surrouding areas, the Heshuo region. Here, poor governance 
was soon followed by swarms of bandits, and in particular led to the rise of the Red 
Jacket Bandits, decimating the Heshuo economy. In the new capital Nanjing 
(Kaifeng), the sudden and enormous influx of military households too created serious 
economic problems. They received large amount of stipend from the state but 
reluctant to farm. Desperate for resources, the Jurchen waged war against the 
Southern Song. It was a disaster for the Jin. The southern parts of Henan, a grain 
basket province of the Jin were ravaged by war, and millions of commoners fled to 
the Southern Song. More importantly, the Red Jacket Bandits, having received 
supplies from the Southern Song, managed to conqueror large parts of Shandong, 
another important Jin province. Together, the lost of Shandong and the destruction of 
Henan, devasted Jin grain production. The Jurchen lost most of the battles against the 
Mongols partly because of their weaker military. But this thesis argues that their 
military defeat is also intimately tied to the precipetious decline of Jin grain 
production. The grains storage in the southern parts of Henan could not provide 
enough grains for the Jin armies to defend against attack. Eventually, the cities in 
Henan fell one by one. 
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1 
 
Literature Review 
 
The economic problems of the Jin Dynasty after relocation of the capital to Nanjing 
(modern Kaifeng) relate to different spheres of disciplines. The fall of the Jin is a 
complex problem not only due to its economic and military policy, but also to its 
diplomatic policies - the changing relationship between the Jin and the Southern 
Song should not be ignored. This literature review will briefly list out the different 
scholarly arguments in a thematic arrangement.  
 
The Fall of Dynasty 
The causes of the fall of Jin Dynasty is a hotly debated topic in Jin history. Several 
historians have discussed the reasons of the fall of Dynasty. 
Guo Renmin’s article The Rise and Fall of Jin Dynasty and its Relationship with 
Agricultural Production
1
 analyzes the fall of Jin Dynasty was due to the moral 
corruption of military households who frequently extorted peasants for grain, 
diminishing the incentive for farmers to expand agriculture.  Moreover, the Jurchens 
also destroyed agricultural production. Guo's interpretation of these events is that the 
commoner or peasant class had lost their class struggle against the domineering and 
aristocratic military households. Another essay, Analyzing the Political Situation of 
Late Jin and the Causes of its Decline,
2
 by Ren Chongyue, argues that the most 
important faultline was government corruption during Xuanzong’s reign (1214-1223), 
while admitting other causes including relocate the capital to Nanjing, corruption of 
Xuanzong, officials and soldiers’ lifestyle, financial problems, foreign relationship 
with Song and military strategy may have also contributed to the fall of the Jin. 
In Jurchen’s Sinicization and the Fall of Great Jurchen Empire3, Liu Pujiang argues 
the adoption of Han Chinese lifestyle by the Jurchen, especially their military 
households, ultimately corrupted the Jurchen and was the primary reason for their 
fall. Since the state heavily relied on military household, the corrupted army led to 
the fall of state. Sun Jiangquan’s essay Also on the Hypothesis of “Sinicization 
                                                 
1
 Guo Renmin 郭人民. “Jin Chao Xing Wang Yu Nong Ye Sheng Chan De Guan Xi” (The Rise and 
Fall of Jin Dynasty and its Relationship with Agricultural Production),  Proceedings of Song, Khitan 
and Jurchen Social and Economic History, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973.  
2
 Ren Chongyue, “Lun Jin Mo Zheng Ju Ji Qi Mie Wang Yuan Yi” (Analyze the Political Situation of 
Late Jin and the Causes of its Decline), Journal of Shangqiu Normal Institute, 1987, Vol. 1.  
3
 Liu Pujiang, “Nu Zhen De Han Hua Dao Lu Yu Da Jin Di Guo De Fu Wang” (Jurchen’s Sinicization 
and the Fall of Great Jurchen Empire), China Studies, Vol. 7. Peking University Publisher, 2000.  
2 
 
Destroyed the Jin Dynasty”4 criticizes Liu’s argument with a large body of primary 
sources, stating there was little relation between sinicization and the corruption of the 
Jurchen. He points out there might indeed be different factors leading to the fall of 
the Jurchen, but the corruption of politics and internal divisions from the reign of 
Zhangzong to Xuanzong (1189-1223), were the major factors. 
Tao Jing-shen’s research on The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China5 provides a brief 
academic review on the fall of the state. He quotes Liu Qi and Yuan Haowen’s view 
that the fall of Jin was due to incomplete sinicization. He also quotes the opposite 
opinion that the fall of Jin was due to the adoption of the literary culture of Song and 
the harsh policy of Liao. Tao comments that sinicization was not the cause of the 
decline of Jin, but is more prominently linked to the mass defections of Chinese and 
Khitan officials as well as a strong Mongol military machine. 
Song Dejin also discusses this topic in Debate on the Fall of Jin Dynasty
6
 and 
provides further quotations of historians’ arguments through quoting several tradition 
historians’ view on related topic and concluded nine arguments. He quotes Yuan 
Haowen who witnessed the fall of Jin’s and attribute it to fate, while a similar 
opinion in Ming Dynasty was also made by He Qiaoxin. The second opinion, raised 
by Liu Qi, is wide-spread discrimination against Han Chinese. The third opinion, by 
Kublai Khan, was that the Jin had fell in the hands Confucian scholars. The forth 
opinion is Genghis Khan attacked Jin on 1211 weakened the foundation of the state, 
quoted in Biography of Chenyu of Jin Shi. The fifth opinion, raised by the Qing 
scholar Zhao Yi, is that the Jin violated the peace treaty. The sixth opinion was by 
another Qing scholar. Li Ciming, who wrote a book review on Gui Qian Zhi 
(Memoirs of Liu Qi) and suggests that it was due to Xuanzong who gave up Zhongdu 
and relocated the capital to Nanjing. The seventh argument, introduced by Li Ye, is 
about the use of 'wicked’ generals in the Sanfengshan battle. The eighth argument is 
about Song scholar Wu Qian’s opinion on the currency and inflation problem caused 
by large amount of paper money issued. The ninth argument, which was more 
                                                 
4
 Sun Jiangquan, “Also on the Hypothesis of “the Hanization Destroyed the Jin Dynasty”, The 
Proceedings of the International Symposium on the History and Archeology of the Liao and Jin 
Dynasties, 2012, Vol. II. 
5
 Tao Jing-shen, The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China, A Study of Sinicization, Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1977. The opinion on the fasl of Jin was due to the adoption of the literary culture 
of Song and the harsh policy of Liao was raised by editor of Dynastic History of Jin Shi 
6
 Song Dejin, edited by Han Shiming, “Da Jin Fu Wang Bian” (Debate on the Fall of Jin Dynasty) , 
Proceeding of Song Liao Jin, Beijing: Chinese Social Science Publisher, 2007.  
3 
 
dominated argument, was due to sinicization. This argument raised by Qing’s 
emperor Taizong and Gaozong. Song Dejin pointed out the corruption of military 
affair after the reign of Zhangzong was the key factor led to the fall of Dynasty. 
Another important factor was the failure of foreign policy. Recently, Yu Wei’s recent 
research Relocation of Capital to Yan and Gave up Yan and the Relation to the fall of 
Jin Dynasty: The Problems of Politics and Geography Raised by the Shift of Political 
Center of Jin Dynasty,
7
 based on geographic perspective, point out the relocation of 
capital to Yanjing (Modern Beijing) was the first step to the weakening of the state. 
Also, there were several debates on the factors related to relocation of capital. Some 
thought it was a sound idea for relocation of capital while some opposed the idea. 
Cai Dongzhou’s article Jin Moved the Capital to Bian and the Survival and Decline 
of Jin Dynasty
8
 suggests that it was necessary for the Jurchens to relocate the capital 
because of geography. At the time, the powerful Mongols were poised to invade 
China, but large swaths of land near the old capital were not defensible terrain. He 
stated that it was a sensible decision for Xuanzong to relocate the capital to Kaifeng 
in order to stabilize Jin central authority. The fact that the Jin were able to muster a 
strong defense at the new capital, Nanjing (Kaifeng), is evidence that relocating the 
capital was a decision of foresight. In addition, he opined that the relocation of the 
capital had little to do with other disastrous events. The war with Southern Song was 
independent to the relocation of capital, and it was also not related to the loss of 
Zhongdu. He points out the that it was ten years after the relocation until general Wu 
Xian 武仙 retreated from the Hebei region. The loss of Zhongdu and Hebei region 
were not related to the relocation of the capital. It should be noted, nevertheless, the 
article does not mention the factors that drove the Mongols launching a western 
expedition, and also does not state that Wu Xian controlled Hebei region in 1225 just 
because he defect Mongol, assassinated Shi Tianyi, Mongolian general and joined 
Red Jacket Bandits, Jin actually lost Heshuo in 1220. Huo Mingkun and Hu Ye’s 
article Analyze Xuanzong Relocation to Kaifeng
9
 also shows the similar argument as 
                                                 
7
 Yu Wei, Qian Yan, Qi Yan Yu Jin Zhi Shuai Wang: Jin Dai Zheng Zhi Zhong Xin Zhuan Yi Zhi Zheng 
Zhi Di Li Wen Ti (Relocation of Capital to Yan and Gave up Yan and the Relation to the fall of Jin 
Dynasty: The Problems of Politics and Geography Raised by the Shift of Political Center of Jin 
Dynasty), Seminar published in Chaoxing Website < 
http://video.chaoxing.com/play_400007062_94865.shtml>   
8
 Cai Dongzhou, “Jin Chao Qian Bian Yu Jin Chao Mie Wang” (Jin Moved the Capital to Bian and the 
Survival and Decline of Jin Dynasty), Journal of Guizhou Normal Institute, 1995. Vol. 1.  
9
 Huo Mingkun, Hu Ye, “Shi Xi Jin Xuanzong Qian Du Kaifeng” (Analyze Xuanzong Relocation to 
4 
 
Cai's article. It analyzes the political and military situation, and then proceeded to 
debate and discusses the several possible locations for relocation. He refuted all the 
other opinions, excpet Nanjing (Kaifeng). This article also stated the advantages of 
relocating the capital. However, the article did not describe the drawbacks of moving 
the capital to Nanjing. Furthermore, it quotes Da Jin Guo Zhi, an unreliable record, 
on the debate of relocation of capital. The faults of the article raised criticism from 
their colleague.
10
 Li Fanghao’s article Discussion about the strategy error of Jin 
dynasty capital moving Kaifeng
11
 comments the relocation of capital might not be a 
good idea because hundreds of court officials turned down the suggestion. Xuanzong 
decided to relocate the capital just because he trusted Shuhu Gaoqi and his judgment. 
He also argues that after Xuanzong moved to Nanjing, Xuanzong became 
complacent. He also points out several problems emerged after the relocation of the 
capital, including territory lost, financial problems, military crises. He states the Jin 
moved the capital to Nanjing led to the fall of Dynasty. It was only because the 
Mongols were preoccupied with their western expeditions that the Jin could continue 
to survive for twenty years after the relocation of the capital. He suggests the state 
should stay in Zhongdu which was defensible or move the capital back to Shangjing 
Huilingfu (Heilongjiang) which was far away from Mongolian invaders. Forty years 
before Li published his article, this idea was raised by Herbert Franke. He points out 
“one reason was certainly that from 1219 onward Chinggis Khan directed the greater 
part of his forces westward in order to attack western Asia; another factor may well 
have been the fear of the Mongols that united loyal Jurchens and Chinese against a 
common foe.”12 
 
Study on Historiographies 
There are several predominant scholars who have deep analysis on the primary 
historical sources related to the topic. Several historians describe the contribution of 
                                                                                                                                          
Kaifeng), Northern Antiques, 2009. Vol. 4.  
10
 The research was careless as Yuan Dynasty historian Su Tianjue had pointed out the history 
recorded in Jin Guo Zhi  was unreliable. The mistake in the part related to relocation of capital was the 
most serious. Su Tianjue, Zi Xi Wen Gao, Beijing: Chunghwa Book Store, 1997. 25, p. 423. 蘇天爵，
滋溪文稿，北京：中華書局。 “金國志，皆不及見國史，其說多得於傳聞。蓋遼末金初稗官小
說中間失實甚多，至如建元改號，傳次征伐，及將相名字，往往杜撰，絕不可信。如張師顏南
遷錄尤為紕繆。” 
11
 Li Fanghao, Discussion about the strategy error of Jin dynasty capital moving Kaifeng, Historical 
Studies, 2012, Vol. 6. 
12
 Cambridge History of China Vol. 6. P. 259. 
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private history to the edit of Jin Shi. The significant research is Zhang Boquan, 
Cheng Nina and Wu Ruhuan’s article Zhongzhou Ji and Jin Shi13, Wang Mingsun’s 
article Edit of State History and the History of Dynastic History of Jin Shi
14
 and Chan 
Hok-lam’s article, Wang O’s contribution to the History of the Chin Dynasty (1115-
1234)
15
. On the other hand, scholars of Chinese literature also argue the alternative 
sources on analysis of Jin Dynasty history, like the study of embassies’ record. Such 
as West Stephen’s book Studies in Chin Dynasty (1115-1234) Literature16 and article, 
Discarded Treasure: The Wondrous Rocks of Lingbi
17
 and Liu Pujiang’s Song 
embassy in the Examine the Quotation of Song Dynasty Embassy
18
  
 
Political History 
Furthermore, there are several significant historical researches on the political history 
of Jin Dynasty affected economic development and ruling policies of Jin Dynasty. 
James T. C. Liu’s article The Jurchen-Song Confrontation: Song Overlooked Points19 
provides a comparison between Jurchen and Mongolian’s invasion and ruling. Wang 
                                                 
13
 Zhang Boquan, Cheng Nina and Wu Ruhuan, “Zhongzhou Ji Yu Jin Shi” (Zhongzhou Ji and Jin Shi)，
Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia Publisher, 2009. It described 
the contribution of Yuan Haowen’s Zhongzhou Ji to the edit of Dynastic History of Jin Shi (Jin Shi). It 
also pointed out the differences in recording historical facts between Zhongzhou Ji and Jin Shi and the 
judgment on some of persons. In addition, it stated the importance on using Zhongzhou Ji as 
supplements on studying Jin Dynasty history. 
14
 Wang Mingsun, “Jin Xiu Guo Shi Ji Jin Shi Yuan Liu” (Edit of state history and the history of 
dynastic history of Jin Shi), Study of Liao Shi, Jin Shi and Yuan Shi, Beijing: Chinese Encyclopedia 
Publisher, 2009. It provided the process of records in Jin Dynasty and the referred sources and 
provided major references of Jin Shi. 
15
 Chan Hok-lam, Wang O’s contribution to the History of the Chin Dynasty (1115-1234), China and 
the Mongols, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999. It analyzed the role of Wang O in editing 
Jin Shi during Yuan Dynasty and the relationship of his work Runan Yishi and Jin Shi of late Jin. 
16
 West Stephen, Studies in Chin Dynasty (1115-1234) Literature, Ann Arbor, Mich. : University 
Microfilms International, 1981. It provided analysis on several important literatures related to Jin 
Dynasty. 
17
 West Stephen Discarded Treasure: The Wondrous Rocks of Lingbi. International Conference of 
Cultural Meanings of Mobility. Mar 2008. It introduced three different diaries wrote by Song 
embassies, including Zhou Hui’s Record of a Northbound Cart, Cheng Zhuo’s Record of Being Sent 
as an Emissary to the North and Fan Chengda’s Record of Holding the Reins. In the article, he used 
literature perspective, provided translation and compared the different perspective on description of 
Henan. 
18
 Liu Pujiang, “Song Dai Shi Chen Yu Lu Kao” (Examine the Quotation of Song Dynasty Embassy), 
10-13 Century China’s Cultural Shock and Integration, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publisher, 2006. 
It analyzed the writing purposes, types of records and provided an annotated bibliography of the 
records of the embassies of Song Dynasty. 
19
 Liu T. C. James, The Jurchen-Song Confrontation: Song Overlooked Points, China Under Jurchen 
Rule, New York: State University of New York Press, 1995. He pointed out the failure policy for Jin 
Dynasty to abrogate puppet Liu Yu led to the loss of support for Han Chinese to support the conquered 
whole China. He quoted Wu Xi’s defect did not gained support from Han Chinese as example, and 
contrast with Mongolian’s use of Han Chinese generals to conquered China. 
6 
 
Hongzhi’s article Emperor Shizong of the Jin Dynasty and the “Long Xing Peace 
Agreement” (Between Southern Song and Jin) 20  analyzes Jin Dynasty economic 
advantages and its economic development after signing peace settlement with Song. 
On the aspect of general history of Jin Dynasty, He Junzhe’s Jin Dynasty History21 
also offers a detail introduction on political and economic historical background. He 
comments that Xuanzong attempted to solve the economic crisis, even the southern 
expedition was one of the policies to solve the economy. But these solutions failed to 
solve the major economic problems.
22
 
 
Military History 
The success of military campaign was related to military preparation, including 
supply and logistics of grains. The result of wars further affected the economy. 
Huang Kuan-chong’s Work Collection of History of Southern Song 23 , Anti Jin 
Voluntary Army in Southern Song
24
 and The Regional Military Forces in Southern 
Song China: Studies of Regional Armies and Local Militias
25
 adopt Song’s 
perspective to analyse the effect of these military force contributed to Shandong 
situation in late Jin. Li Tianming’s Song Yuan War History26 describes Shandong 
bandits and Song, Mongol and Jurchen’s transition of political situation and their 
interaction after Jurchen moved to Kaifeng (1214) Public opinions, officials’ 
arguments, geography and military power are analyzed. Han Zhiyuan’s Military 
History of Southern Song and Jin
27
 provides a general description on military system, 
organization and the wars between Song and Jin. Wang Zengyu also did a research 
on Military System of Khitan and Jurchen
28
. It was a pioneer and deep research on 
                                                 
20
 Wang Hongzhi, “Jin Shizong Yu Long Xing He Yi” (Emperor Shizong of the Jin Dynasty and the 
“Long Xing Peace Agreement” (Between Southern Song and Jin) ), Proceedings of Liao and Song 
History Vol. 2, Beijing: Documents Publisher, 1987.  
21
 He Junzhe, Jin Chao Shi (Jin Dynasty History), Beijing: China Social Science Publisher, 1992.  
22
 He Junzhe, Jin Chao Shi (Jin Dynasty History), Beijing: China Social Science Publisher, 1992. Pp. 
436-437. 
23
 Huang Kuan-chung, Nan Song Shi Yan Jiu Ji (Work Collection of History of Southern Song). Taipei: 
Xin Wen Feng, 1985.  
24
 Huang Kuan-chung, Nan Song Shi Dai Kang Jin De Yi Jun (Anti Jin Voluntary Army in Southern 
Song), Taipei: Lian Jing Publisher, 1988.   
25
 Huang Kuan-chung, Nan Song Di Fang Wu Li: Di Fang Jun Yu Min Jian Zi Wei Wu Li De Tan Tao 
(The Regional Military Forces in Southern Song China : Studies of Regional Armies and Local 
Militias). Taipei: Dong Da Gu Fen Tu Shu You Xian Gong Si, 2002.  
26
 Li Tianming, Song Yuan War History, Taipei: Shi Huo Publisher, 1988.  
27
 Han Zhiyuan, Nan Song Jin Jun Shi Shi (Military History of Southern Song and Jin), Beijing: 
Military Science Publisher, 1984.  
28
 Wang Zengyu, Liao Jin Jun Zhi (Military System of Khitan and Jurchen), Baoding: Hebei 
7 
 
military system of Jin Dynasty.  
 
Jin-Song Relationship 
In addition, the interaction between Jurchen and Song was interrelated with Jin-Song 
relation after Jurchen relocated the capital. Zhao Yongcun’s History of Jin-Song 
Relationship
29
 describes the general transition of Jin-Song relationship and provided 
some comments on these policies. Richard Davis has published two books on Song-
Jin relation in Song perspective. In Court and Family in Sung China 960-1279
30
, he 
analyzes the foreign policies, which were adopted by three Song Prime Ministers 
from Shi family. In The Cambridge History of China
31
, he describes the raise and fall 
of Red Jacket Bandits in Shandong and the transition of Song’s court policy to 
Jurchen. Wang Gaofei’s The Stop of Jiading Tribute and the Change of Song-Jin 
Relationship
32
 also uses Song’s perspective to discuss Song’s termination of paying 
tribute and the deterioration of Song Jin relationsip during the reign of Xuanzong (or 
Song’s Jiading). Other work collections wrote by Song’s scholars were referred, but 
there was a lack of analysis on the worsening relation in Jurchen perspective. 
 
Economic History 
There are a number of foreign scholars who have conducted deep researches on the 
economic history related to Jin Dynasty. Takahashi Hiroomi’s book, Study of 
Monetary History in Song, Jin and Yuan Dynasty
33
, provides a research on the late 
Jin’s currency system. It refers to political and social factors. It also describes the 
economic problem caused by paper money. Mikami Tsugio’s book, Research on 
                                                                                                                                          
University Press, 2011. The research referred to wide ranges of historical documents and work 
collections and did a careful selection on sources. The research systemically managed the messy 
information of Treatise of War in Jin Shi, described the military household system, cavalryman, 
military expenditures, weapons, etc. 
29
 Zhao Yongcun, Jin Song Guan Xi Shi (History of Jin-Song Relationship), Beijing: People Publisher, 
2005.  
30
 Davis Richard Lee, Court and Family in Sung China, 960-1279: Bureaucratic Success and Kinship 
Fortunes for the Shih of Ming-chou, Duke: Duke University Press, 1986. 
31
 The Cambridge History of China, Volume 5: The Sung Dynasty and its Precursors, 907-1279 (Part 
1), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, political narrative for the reigns of Kuang-tsung, 
Ning-tsung, and Li-tsung. 
32
 Wang Gaofei, The Stop of Jiading Tribute and the Change of Song － Jin Relationship, Journal of 
Mianyang Normal University, 2011, vol. 30. 
33
 Takahashi Hiroomi, Trans. Lin Songtao. Song Jin Yuan Huo Bi Shi Yan Jiu (Study of Monetary 
History in Song, Jin and Yuan Dynasty),Shanghai: Shanghai Classical Publisher, 2010.  
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Jurchen in Jin Dynasty
34
 also presents an in depth analysis on military household 
system Mengan Mouke 猛安謀克 about its corruption, degeneration and economic 
impact in late Jin Dynasty. Tao Jing-shen’s another work, Analysis on Jurchen 
History,
35
 also discusses the social crisis of Jurchen society since middle Jin Dynasty. 
It suggests that it was due to the corruption of Jurchen people’s lifestyle gained 
special right. Toyama Gunji’s research, Study of Jin Dynasty History,36 linked up 
economic situation to analyze mid-Jin’s decision on military actions to Song and 
Mongol. It also describes the southward movement of Yellow River during the reign 
of Zhangzong and its effect on the tension between Jurchen and Han Chinese, and 
stated it might be one of the reasons for the fall of dynasty. 
On the general economic history of Jin Dynasty, Herbert Franke describes the 
political situation of late Jin and introduces the economic development, trading, 
currencies, transportation and industries of Jin.
37
 Chinese scholar Zhang Boquan’s 
General Economic History of Jin Dynasty
38
 is an early general economic history of 
Jin Dynasty done in China. Qi Xia’s General History on Liao Song Xi Xia Jin, 
Volume of Society and Economy
39
 also provides a general introduction of economy 
during Jin Dynasty. 
In the research specific to the commercial development, Wang Depeng’s The 
Commercial economy research of the Jin Dynasty
40
 offers a general study of 
commercial development. He suggests that despite the recovery of economy of the 
Central Plain during mid Jin Dynasty, the commercial activities could not compare to 
the level of Northern Song. Furthermore, the research related to late Jin’s economic 
                                                 
34
 Mikami Tsugio, trans. Jin Qicong. Jin Dai Nu Zhen Yan Jiu (Research on Jurchen in Jin Dynasty), 
Harbin: Heilongjiang People Publisher, 1984.  
35
 Tao Jing-shen, Nu Zhen Shi Lun (Analysis on Jurchen History), Banqiao: Daoxiang Publisher, 2010.  
36
 Toyama Gunji, trans. Li Dongyuan, Jin Chao Shi Yan Jiu (Study of Jin Dynasty History), Harbin: 
Heilongjiang Choson Ethnics Publisher, 1988.  
37
 Herbe Franke, edited by Denis Twitchett, The Cambridge History of China Vol. 6, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978. 
38
 Zhang Boquan, Jin Dai Jin Ji Shi Lue (General Economic History of Jin Dynasty), Shenyang: 
Liaoning People’s Publisher, 1981.He described the population, industries, business, etc. The book 
published just after Cultural Revolution, he used a radical socialism perspective to analyse Jin’s 
economic development. 
39
 Qi Xia, Liao Song XI Xia Jin Dai Tong Shi (General History on Liao Song Xi Xia Jin), Volume of 
Society and Economy, Beijing: People Publisher, 2010.  
40
 Wang Depeng, Jin Dai Shang Ye Jin Ji Yan Jiu (The Commercial Economy Research of the Jin 
Dynasty), Beijing: Documents on Social Science Publisher, 2011. The book includes different 
industries, trading, tax, etc. A wide range of sources including Song, Jin and Yuan’s work collection 
and archaeological reports were referred. This is also the first study of commercial history of Jin 
Dynasty. 
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history include Japanese scholar Katō Shige’s Trading of Song and Jin 41  which 
provided a detail research on trading between Song and Jin. It describes the 
installation of trading, regulations of markets, exchanged product.  Tea, Money and 
Silk in the Trading Between Song and Jin
42
 provides further detail in these specific 
products. He describes the smuggling activities on tea along the Huai River. He also 
quotes the work collections of Song and Jin to provide addition information on the 
flow of money. Furthermore, he compares the price of silk between Song and Jin and 
refers the data of production of silk in northern Song to explain the selling of silk 
from Jin to Song to exchange for tea. Quan Hansheng’s Smuggle Trading Between 
Song and Jin
43
 based on Katō Shige’s research to provide extra sources on analysis. 
He points out the demand and supply of the above products between two states, and 
provided a unique argument of the necessary to smuggle for these two states as that 
there were different products produced in different latitude, but the river travelled in 
the similar latitude. Since there was strict regulation of markets trading between 
Song and Jin, thus the problems of smuggling rose. Qiao Youmei’s research, The 
Struggle of Coins in the Trading between Song and Jin
44
 further analyzes the change 
and the purpose of economic competition, and comments that Jin had intention and 
planning to procure the coins from Song. In 1982, mainland scholar Chen Xinquan 
also did a research, Examine on Song-Jin Market Trading
45
 which is a detail, but 
highly similar with previous findings by other scholars. 
On the specific theme of trading, Japanese scholar Kato Shige was one of the 
pioneers for the research of Jin Dynasty economic history. His research, Study of 
Gold and Silver during Tang and Song Dynasty
46
 based on his good knowledge of 
                                                 
41
 Katō Shige, Trading of Song and Jin, Zhongguo Jin Ji Shi Kao Zheng (Examine on Chinese 
Economic History), Beijing: Commercial Publisher, 1963. This research not only referred to Jin Shi, 
but also quoted a large number of Song’s sources including Jiangyan Yi Lai Xi Nian Yao Lu, Song Hui 
Yao  , Wen Xian Tong Kao, etc. Thus, it provided a detail analysis on different types of products and 
the different demands of goods between two states. 
42
 Katō Shige, Tea, Money and Silk in the Trading Between Song and Jin, Beijing: Commercial 
Publisher, 1963.  
43
 Quan Hansheng, “Song Jin Jiang De Zou Si Mao Yi” (Smuggle Trading Between Song and Jin), 
Proceedings of Song, Khitan and Jurchen Social and Economic History, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song 
Man Book Store, 1973. His research provided on quotations in other chapters in Song Hui Yao 
together with Treaties of Food and Commodes of Song Shi together as reference, to analyse the 
smuggling activity of grains, tea, salt, ginger, military necessities and money. 
44
 Qiao Youmei, “Song Jin Mao Yi ZHong Zhen Duo Tong Bi De Dou Zhen”  (The Struggle of Coins 
in the Trading between Song and Jin), Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publisher, 1985.  
45
 Chen Xinquan, “Song Jin Que Chang Mao Yi Kao Lue” (Examine on Song-Jin Market Trading), 
Proceeding of Liao and Jin History, Shenyang: Liaoning People’s Publisher, 1985.  
46
 Kato Shige, translated by Federal Reserve Bank of China, Study of Gold and Silver during Tang and 
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Song’s Monetary History, he compares the usage of silver with Song and discusses 
the development of the regulation of the use of silver and the effect on paper money. 
American scholar, Chan Hok-lam’s Tea Production and Tea Trade Under the 
Jurchen-Chin Dynasty
47
 quotes some Song sources to provide detail analysis on the 
regulations of cross border markets. Chan also clarified the price of tea purchased 
from Song, recorded in Song Shi. Chan also based on the consumption of large 
amount of tea from Song to Jin to further explain the lack of resources, weak 
foundation and highly dependent of economy in Jin Dynasty. 
 
Regional Economic History 
Regional economic history could enhance the understanding of the development of 
Central Plan, but there was a lack of study of the Central Plain of Jin Dynasty. 
Recently, Chinese scholars have begun to conduct research on regional economic 
history, to analyze the evolution of the economic and industrial development of the 
region. However, part of the research just briefly describes Jin Dynasty’s economic 
development.Yuan Ji’s article Commoner’s Livelihood in the Northern Region of 
Yellow River during the Transition between Jin and Yuan Dynasty
48
 was a pioneer 
research, providing detail description on the livelihood of commoners under the 
policy of late Jin and early Yuan government. A wide range of inscription on the 
gravestone recorded in work collections of early Yuan scholars were quoted, as a 
valuable supplementary record for the official Jin and Yuan history on basic level of 
society. 
On the economic research on Hebei, Xie Zhicheng has published an article Jin 
Dynasty’s Development and Recover of Economic in Hebei49. Two years ago, Xing 
Tie’s Hebei’s Economy in Song Liao Jin Period50 provided a general introduction of 
economy in different aspects in Hebei region. However, the research was lack of 
                                                                                                                                          
Song Dynasty, Hong Kong: Lung Mun Book Store, 1970.  
47
 Chan Hok-lam, Tea Production and Tea Trade Under the Jurchen-Chin Dynasty, Studies on the 
Jurchen and the Chin Dynasty, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1997. 
48
 Yuan Ji, Commoners’ “Jin Yuan Zhi Ji Jiang Bei Zhi Ren Min Sheng Huo” (Commoners’ 
Livelihood in the Northern Region of Yellow River During the Transition Between Jin and Yuan 
Dynasty), Collection of Thesis of Yuan Shi, Taibei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1974.  
49
 Xie Zhicheng, “Jin Dai He Bei Jin Ji De Fa Zhan He Hui Fu” (Jin Dynasty’s Development and 
Recover of Economic in Hebei), Hebei Academic Journal, 1990, Vol. 3. In the article, he referred to a 
wide range of Jin and Song sources, including literary sketches, gazetteers and work collections, 
together with the archaeology report, to offer an overall research on the economic development in 
Hebei and analyze the rise and fall of the economy there. 
50
 Xing Tie, Hebei’s Economy in Song Liao Jin Period, Beijing: Science Publisher, 2011. 
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information and analysis on the rise and fall of the economy. This research has plenty 
of room for further improvement. On the research on Henan economic history, 
Cheng Minsheng, Cheng Feng and Ma Yuchen’s recent published book Ancient 
Henan Economic History
51
 is a general economic history of Henan. It discusses the 
evolution of Henan’s economy. However, it seldom mentions the economic problems 
of Henan in late Jin. Thus my thesis will mainly analyze the economic problems 
pertaining to the late Jin period. 
 
Study on Tax 
On the study of tax, Herbert Franke’s A Note on Wine52 described the drinking habit 
on Jin Dynasty and the wine tax collected. Furthermore, Liu Pujiang also analyzed 
on the tax of Jin Dynasty in his articles, Discussion on Properties and Properties Tax 
in Jin Dynasty
53
 and Analysis on Jin Dynasty’s Miscellaneous Levies.54  
 
Population History 
Population size is one of the heated discussion topics among Chinese scholars. They 
have attempted to speculate the amount of grains consumption and tax collection. On 
the analysis of population and households’ history of Jin Dynasty, Wu Songdi’s 
Chinese Migration History,
55
 analyzing work collections, gazetteers and official 
histories, study the southward movement of population during the reign of Zhenyou 
(1213-1217). The origin and destination of migration are identified, and the number 
of migration is speculated. It is essential to fill up the gap from the Jin Shi. His book, 
Chinese Population History
56
, further elaborates the argument by analyzing the 
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 Cheng Minsheng, Cheng Feng and Ma Yuchen, Gu Dai Henan Jinji Shi (Ancient Henan Economic 
History), Kaifeng: Henan University Press, 2012.  
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 Herbert Franke, A Note on Wine, Studies on the Jurchen and the Chin Dynasty, Vermont: Ashgate 
Publishing Company, 1997. He commented the large consumption of wine was a habit of northern 
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in Jin Dynasty), Historical Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 
1999.  
54
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Historical Essays on Liao and Jin Dynasty, Shenyang: Liaoning University Publisher, 1999. The 
previous one described the significant of the setup of united property tax and labor service policy, and 
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55
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Publisher, 1998.  
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population density and compare with the previous dynasty, to prove that during mid 
Jin Dynasty, there was negative population growth in Henan. 
Furthermore, the topic of households recorded in the Treaties of Geography in Jin 
Shi was a heated debate among historians. Liang Fangzhong’s research Survey on 
Chinese Historical Households, Farmland and Tax
57
 based on Treaties of Geography, 
identifies that Jin had an overall population increase in 1223. However, Han 
Guanghui’s Correctness of Households in Treatise of Geography of Jin Shi58 points 
out that there was unlikely a sharp population growth in Kaifeng from 1152-1207. He 
suggests that Kaifeng’s households should be around 400,000 during the reign of 
Zhangzong and the numbers in Treatise of Geography was recorded in 1207. The 
1,746,210 households recorded in Treatise of Geography should be during the reign 
of Xuanzong.Wang Yumin’s Analysis on households recorded in Treatise of 
Geography in Jin Shi
59
 provides supplementary arguments and points out the 
different number of households recorded in Treatise of Food and Commodes and 
Treatise of Geography and notes that the number of households in Treatise of 
Geography should not be recorded in 1208. It also suggests that different regions 
should be recorded in different time periods. Liu Pujiang’s article Study of Jin 
Dynasty Households
60
 suggests the year the household figures recorded in Treatise of 
Geography was in 1207. But this figure did not include the military household. After 
including the military households, it had a consistence growth rate of household and 
population by around 9 and 10%, compared with previous year. He also points out 
register of refugees and migration led to the increase of number. He also speculates 
that the households in the Central Plain, with reference to Yuan Shi, should be around 
2.5 million and 13,600,000 people in the period of late Jin. He also proves that the 
number of households referred to Treatise of Food and Commodes as the Treatise of 
Geography was not reliable. 
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Geographic History and Studies of Capitals 
There was a close connection of selection of capitals with the economic development, 
transportation and geographic position. The following will describe some of the 
important researches in related aspect. 
On the capital studies, Shi Nianhai’s Chinese Ancient Capitals and Culture 61 
describes the studies of ancient capitals and its criteria. It also discusses the relation 
between the capital and military, natural factor, economy, transportation and other 
factors. Wang Hui’s Chinese Geographic History62 also describes ancient capital’s 
purpose of setting and the advantages and disadvantages on setting there. He points 
out Song still set the capital in Kaifeng because of the convenience of canal 
transportation.
63
 Kaifeng was “the essential place for southern goods to transport to 
the north. There was none of natural barrier. Also it faced the threat from Yellow 
River. It was for the convenience of canal transportation but lack of long term 
insight”64 Liu Yingchun’s Discover the Secrets of Kaifeng Cities65 is a recent research 
on the study of the evolution of ancient capital Kaifeng. . 
In the studies related to Jin Dynasty transportation, Quan Hansheng’s Transportation 
Canals and Tang Song Emperor
66
 argues the use of function of canals transportation 
during the period of Song Jin confrontation, and the consequences of the interruption 
of the canals. 
 
Other Studies 
Labour services also related to the economic development. Chan Hok-lam’s Labour 
Service Under the Chin introduced different types of labour service and the related 
taxes. It also discussed the labours mobilized through the construction of Kaifeng 
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capital repair on rivers, and other factors. 
 
In this thesis, it will focus on the problems caused by relocation of capital to Kaifeng 
in late Jin. The research will focus on economic factor, policies and the consequences. 
There is not doubt that the fall of Jin Dynasty was mainly due to military loss to 
Mongols. Mongols was the most recent highly uncivilized authority which 
successfully eliminated one of the most civilized states, Jin Dynasty. It had 
eliminated 40 states including Xi Xia before the fall of Jin,
67
 and later conquered 
entire China proper and most region of Eurasia. Thus, the economic factor was 
interrelated to the military loss. Furthermore, the failure on military strategy during 
the reign of Weishaowang (1208-1213) caused the damage of Hebei and Shandong 
was another major reason. However, we should not neglect the factor, particularly the 
drawbacks of several economic policies implemented after Xuanzong relocated to 
Kaifeng, including destruction of the economy and social foundation of the state. 
That further undermined the state’s military strength. 
  
                                                 
67
 Runan Yishi, 2, p. 20. 
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Background 
 
During mid-Jin Dynasty, the state focused on developing Hebei and Shandong to 
support Zhongdu, but only few resources spent on Henan. Thus after relocation of 
capital, the underdeveloped Henan required further development. 
In addition, Mongolian invasion and flooding of Yellow River during mid-Jin 
Dynasty created serious economic destruction to the state, shown by rise of tax rate 
since 1190s. Fortunately the state did not lose any territory so that the economy could 
be recovered within years.  Zhangzong implemented mild economic policies to 
handle the worsened economic problems. It was a contrast to the economic policy 
adopted by Xuanzong after losing northern part of the Central Plain. 
 
Section 1 Economic Development in Zhongdu and Neighboring Regions in Mid 
Jin Dynasty (1161-1208) 
 
Historians claimed the Jin Dynasty’s economic development reached the peak during 
the two reigns of Shizong and Zhangzong. As early as in the reign of Hailingwang 
(Reign: 1150-1161), Jin relocated the capital to Zhongdu (Modern Beijing) and 
Nanjing (Modern Kaifeng) respectively. The next emperor Shizong (1161-1189) 
returned the capital to Zhongdu. The Central Plains, especially the regions around 
Zhongdu, Hebei (Jin’s Hebei, northern side of Yellow River) had extraordinary 
economic development. It was explained by well-developed river transportation and 
busy business activities. 
 
Hebei’s River Transportation and Granaries 
Zhongdu was convenient for transportation. Hailingwang decided to relocate the 
capital to Zhongdu because it could easily control the Central Plains.
68
 Hebei and 
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山 was a better option as the centre of the world. The emperor accepted the idea and immediately 
constructed a capital city in Yanshan. He spent three years to finish it. (Story of Hailingwang; as cited 
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Shandong region transported the grains to the capital through river transportation. 
Yuan Yi Tong Zhi recorded there were more than ten rivers and canals around Dadu 
(modern Beijing, Jin Dynasty’s Zhongdu) connecting neighboring regions in Yuan 
Dynasty (1271-1368).
69
 The waterways mainly passed through northern part of the 
Central Plain. 
70
 For example, taxes collected from Xianzhou and Qingzhou were 
transported upstream to Tongzhou, ten more days later arrived to the capital.
71
 The 
cities along the canals set up granaries.
72
 The river transportation system in Hebei 
could transport dozen thousands to over a million piculs of grains to the capital in 
short term.
73
 
 
Moreover, Lugou River development project was implemented in 1170.
74
 It aimed at 
transfering products from southern circuits to the capital to enhance business 
activity.
75
 Unfortunately, the project was not successful.
76
  Furthermore, to ensure the 
smooth transportation of the grains, the government devoted 6000 military laborers 
to excavating the canals in 1205.
77
 It shows that the river transportation in Hebei and 
Shandong was crucial to the state’s economy. 
 
Grain Supplies from Manchuria 
The state also transported the grains from Manchuria to the Central Plain, where the 
place was rich in grains production. Yuan Dynasty’s Gazetteers on Unification 
describes that Liaoyang produced different types of grains products.
78
 The 
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agricultural production in northeast was more than three times of surplus annually. 
The excess grains were stored. The accumulated storage in granaries was 2,476,000 
piculs.
79
 The grains storage in Manchuria granaries were not for relief purpose before 
1177.
80
 Thus there was large amount of storage of grains for these granaries 
sufficient for tens of years. 
Through the Grand Canal in Shandong, the grains in Liaodong and Beijing (modern 
Jinzhou and Inner Mongolia) were transported to Shandong by vessels traveling 
through the sea.
81
 Through the canal, Hebei and the Central Plains could have easily 
access to the resources in Northeast if the Central Plain was suffered from starvation. 
 
Business in Hebei and Zhongdu 
The busy business activity reflected the flourish economic development. The 
increase of commercial tax collected was also strongly related to the economic 
growth. 
 
Silk Production Ground and Commercial Activities 
Zhongdu had long been a commercial city. Through being Jurchen’s capital for 50 
years, the place had growing business activities. Jin Dynasty levied commercial tax 
in 1180, and procured huge amount of tax collected. That became a large proportion 
of Jin’s tax income. Also, Yuan Dynasty’s Gazetteers on Unification records different 
types of silk products that were made in Anzhou of Dadu circuit.
82
 The trade of high 
valued silk product enhanced the commercial activities in the capital as well. 
Through the increasingly busy business activity and the raise of commercial tax rate, 
the state benefitted from around one third increase in tax income. During the reign of 
Dading (1161-1189), Zhongdu gained 164,440 strings of commercial tax annually. In 
1196, the annual commercial tax rose to 214,579 strings.
83
 There was about 30% 
increase of the collected commercial tax. If we exclude the 1 to 2% increase in the 
tax rate, there was still around 28 and 29% of increase in commercial tax, which 
shows the rapid increase of business activity in Zhongdu. 
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Wine tax was another important source of income to Jin Dynasty’s economy. It was 
also a sign of the flourish of business activity in Zhongdu and neighbouring 
metropolitan prefectures. Before 1190, wine tax collected in Zhongdu was 361,500 
strings annually, and increased to 405,133 strings in 1195, increased 20%. In Xijing, 
the original tax collected was 53,467 strings, increased 50% to 107,893 strings in 
1195.
84
 It was directly related to the rapid growth of economy in northern China as 
well. 
 
Food Production in Zhongdu 
Food supply is important to measure the economy of the place. Yuan Yi Tong Zhi 
recorded that grains, fishes, ducks, salt were produced in Baodi (Tianjin) while 
grains were grown in Wanping (Xicheng District of modern Beijing) and Changping 
(Changping District) near Dadu.
85
 In addition, Da Yuan Hun Yi Fang Yu Sheng Lan 
recorded Daxingfu of Yanjing (Zhongdu) had plenty water supply and the land was 
fertilized.
86
There was large amount of wet paddy fields. The wet paddy field 
benefited from the irrigation system in Zhongdu brought 10,000 hu (5,000 piculs) for 
the region annually.
87
 Furthermore, there was trial implementation of “Quzongfa” or 
“Section Planting Method” in the southern region of capital, Hedong and Daizhou.88  
It showed that the state devoted its attention in Zhongdu’s agricultural production. 
 
By analyzing the Hebei’s economy before relocation of capital, we can understand 
that Hebei and Shandong was the pillar of Jin Dynasty’s economy. 
 
Section 2 Economic Development in Henan in Mid Jin Dynasty 
 
Henan was not the core of Jin Dynasty’s economic development before relocation of 
capital. During the discussion of the project on Yellow River, Emperor Zhangzong 
(Reign: 1189-1208) had stated that: 
 
The state had long been considering the flooding in Hebei and dams had been 
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constructed…Reviewing the entire state, although the region in Shandong is 
more important than Henan, all commoners are my son and there should be 
no differences among them.
89
 
 
Zhangzong’s words suggest that Henan was strategically less important than 
Shandong before Xuanzong relocated the capital to Henan. At that time, Henan was 
in remoted region and its economy was underdeveloped. Zhangzong’s policy of 
opening up Henan region stimulated a sharp rise of population in Henan, but its 
economy was still far lagged behind compared with Northern Song.The canal 
transportation was worse than Northern Song era and also Hebei region. Although 
there were large areas of land, just a few people lived there, probably due to the 
instable situation of this border region. The poverty of Henan shows that the state 
had to put extra resources after relocation of capital. 
 
Song envoy Lou Yue recorded that Henan was still a region of poverty because 
Jurchen had confiscated commoner’s properties during Jinkang incident in 1127 and 
transferred the treasures to Shangjing, thus there was only little resources left in 
Henan.
90
 Bianjing Yi Ji Zhi also has recorded that all the treasures stored in Bianjing 
were taken by Jurchen barbarian.
91
 The flourish Henan was turned a poor region. Lou 
commented that it was not worth for Song to recover this barrened Henan.
92
 Another 
Song envoy who visited Jin one year later also commented that the damaged Kaifeng 
had not been recovered until Hailingwang relocated the capital there. The palace was 
“beautiful”, but the common area was “barren”. The new city was still ruined. There 
was some farmland inside the city.
93
 Since Nanjing was the economic centre of 
Nanjinglu, or Henan, the ruined Nanjing showed that Henan was devestated during 
mid-Jin Dynasty. 
 
Backwarded River Transportation in Henan 
Although river and canals transportation in Henan was well developed in Northern 
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Song, it was obsoleted during mid-Jin Dynasty. In the Treatise of River and Canals 
of Jin Shi, the three famous transportation canals around Dongjing (Kaifeng) in 
Northern Song, namely Guangji River, Bian River and Huimin River traveling to the 
southern region of Henan were not recorded. Henan’s canals was a large contrast to 
the the usage and maintenance of Hebei’s canals in mid-Jin Dynasty. Bei Xing Ri Lu 
described Henan’s river did not have any maintenance: 
 
The Yellow River breeched its (Southlake) banks in the fifth month of last 
year, and there was much damage. The waters of the Yellow River merged 
with Southlake, washing away the old road. Brushwood was piled on top of it, 
and then straw and dirt in order to give carts and horses access.
94
 
 
Lou also recorded that the wheat was cultivated in the bottom of Bian River.
95
 It 
showed part of Bian River was dried up already. Zhou Hui, another Song’s envoy 
also witnessed that the Bian River turned shallow. It was blocked in Biankou. He 
remembered that in Northern Song, 6,000,000 piculs grains transported from 
Yangzhou, passed through Yangtze River and Huai River and Bian River to Kaifeng 
within 40 days. 50 years after the fall of Northern Song, he lamented the river 
became a drainage.
96
 Moreover, Bian River dried up in Lingbi county (Anhui), 
region near Suzhou 宿州 ,97  the river could not be functioned for transportation 
between north and south as the past. Yuan Yi Tong Zhi recorded the name of Bian 
River as Bian Canal (汴渠).98 It showed the Bian River turned narrow during Jin 
Dynasty. In late Northern Song, Wang Anshi had conducted large scale construction 
work in Bian River in winter for the transportation in winter.
99
 However, the effort 
was in vain after Jurchen conquered Henan. 
 
Development in Henan During Zhangzong 
During the 40 years peaceful period after the signing of peace settlement with 
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Southern Song in 1164, Jurchen started to encourage people open up Henan. In 1187, 
Jin government provided tax exemption and subsidies to encourage refugees to 
cultivate several prefectures in the southern border like Tangzhou, Dengzhou, 
Yinzhou, Caizhou, Shuzhou, Sizhou and so on.
100
 Henan had large amount of 
farmland but there was a lack of farmers. Even Hedong (Shanxi) had more 
population than Henan. Court officials proposed to cultivate the farmland in Henan 
to solve the overcrowded problem and shortage of farms in neighbor circuits.
101
 At 
that time, Henan was benefited from relatively mild climate, (See Appendices) thus 
the region started to develop. In 1192, Henan still had 63,520 qing of grazing land 
not yet distributed, while neighboring Shanxi Province had 35,680 qing.
102
 The open 
up policy of Henan region failed. In 1208, the state continued to encourage peasants 
to open up barren farmland by exempting the tax from one to three years.
103
 
We could refer to Liu Pujiang’s quotation on the number of households with northern 
Song’s data in 1102 and Jin’s data in 1207 from Song Shi and Jin Shi. 
 
Table 1: Comparison on Henan’s Prefectures Between 1102 - 1207 
Prefectures Households 
in 1207 
Households 
in 1102 
Prefectures Households 
in 1207 
Households 
in 1102 
Guidefu 76389 79741 Ruzhou 35254 41587 
Shanzhou 65545 61409 Bozhou 60535 130119 
Shanzhou 41010 47806 Chenzhou 26145 32064 
Dengzhou 24989 114127 Caizhou 36093 98502 
Tangzhou 11031 202172 Xizhou 9685 
Henanfu 55635 127767 Zhengzhou 45657 55976 
Songzhou 26649 Yinzhou 16714 78174 
Xuzhou 45587 66041 Suzhou 55058 91483 
Junzhou 18510 Sizhou 8092 63632 
Source: Liu Pujiang, Study of Jin Dynasty’s Households, History Essays on Liao and 
Jin Dynasty, p. 160. 
 
Liu Pujiang comments that the prefectures closed to the border with Song like 
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Tangzhou had only 5.5 % of households compared with 100 years ago. The other 
border prefectures like Caizhou, Dengzhou and Yinzhou also showed a large contrast 
compared with northern Song, with around 15% and 40% differences.
104
Thus, it was 
not surprising to see that Jin’s population growth was caused by the large amount of 
immigration. However, the number of households in Henan in 1207, when the state’s 
population reached the peak,
105
 was still largely inferior to that in northern Song. 
Cheng Minsheng comments that the economy of Henan Jin Dynasty’s was not “as 
poor as we imagine”.106 But we can see that, however, despite the high growth rate, 
most regions in Henan were underdeveloped before the capital had relocated to there. 
Henan was still backward when compared with most circuits in the Central Plains.  
 
Section 3: Changing Route of the Yellow River 
 
During mid Jin Dynasty, the state’s river management focused on the northern 
riverbank and neglected the south. That caused the Yellow River changed its course 
to the south, and later affected Henan region. Jin Shi describes that both Huai and 
Yellow River belonged to Jin’s territory after the fall of Liu Yu’s authority. Through 
these dozen years, Yellow River sometimes blocked and sometimes flooded, and 
changed its route frequently.
107
Flooding not only destroyed residents’ properties, but 
also affected the neighbouring regions. A large number of soldiers and resources 
were devoted to flood prevention.
108
 
Jurchen put large amount efforts to monitor and conduct flood prevention project in 
Yellow River during the reign of Shizong and Zhangzong (1161-1208). Yellow River 
started diverge its route since the flooding occurred in 1168. 60% of water flowed 
southward but the state did not intervene the changing of water flow.
109
 In 1190, the 
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state decided to diverge some of water flow to the south.
110
 Furthermore, the 
construction project of Yellow River allowed Caozhou and Shanzhou to be flooded 
but prevent Shandong being flooded in future to minimize labor work
111
 and not to 
affect the farmland and salt field.
112
 It showed Jurchen’s economic center was in 
Shandong region. The court aimed to reduce its negative effect on northern riverbank. 
Under the project, 25 dams were constructed along the river. 6 in the south while 19 
in the north.
113
 After Zhangzong had determined to take a series of measure to 
prevent flooding, then Yellow River had not been flooded in Heshuo region after 
1194. (See Appendices)  
The reparation work successfully protected the northern part of Yellow River. 
However, Yellow River changed to a southern route, limited the territory of Jin 
Dynasty after relocation of capital. Li Tianming commented it was the forth changing 
route of Yellow River amount history.
114
 Indeed, the two serious flooding in Henan in 
1216 and 1220 was probably related to the changed route of Yellow River. The 
pertaining economic problems would be narrated later. 
 
Section 4 Several Economic Features of Mid Jin Dynasty 
 
Jin Dynasty’s economy reached the peak in 1180s and the Jin court reduced the 
amount of tax on daily necessity since the middle period of the reign of Dading. 
There were a number of scholars, particularly Xie Zhicheng
115
, Cheng Minsheng
116
, 
Qi Xia and Qiao Youmei, who compares the economic situation in mid Jin 
Dynasty.
117
 They points out that the Jin economy reached the peak during Shizong 
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and Zhangzong (1161-1208). Zhang Boquan comments the economy reached the 
peak during the reign of Mingchang (1190-1196), but the corruption of state led to 
the downturn of economy.
118
 Herbert Franke had slightly different opinion. He 
comments that “under Shih-tsung, the Chin state was able to maintain itself against 
overwhelming odds in later year.” During the reign of Zhangzong, a serious of 
natural causes “debilitated the economic foundations of the Chin state.”119 Franke’s 
opinion was different from other Chinese scholars. Since the government expenditure 
on military reward highly relied on the tax collected on the daily necessity, through 
studying the changing tax rate, the economic condition could be analyzed. Jin 
Dynasty’s economy was fragile during mid-Jin Dynasty through the tax increase and 
other related economic-related policy adopted during Zhangzong reign. At that time, 
the state still controlled the entire region of Central Plains and most of region in the 
Manchuria and the state income kept stable. Thus, the economy could be recovered. 
 
Flash of Ball Pen of the Flourish Economy 
In late 1180s, 25 years before the relocation of capital, Jin Dynasty’s economy 
reached the peak, but it lasted less than ten years. It could be reflected in tax 
reduction policy. Court official Zheng Yan stated that Jin Dynasty enjoyed long term 
peace and controlled large amount of households. The reduction of salt tax just 
reduced the state’s annual income of 1,200,000 strings. He also points out that the 
storage in the all the granaries had 100,000,000 strings, which was “sufficient for 100 
years usage” even if there was deficit in salt tax.120 The actual amount of salt tax 
collection reduced 1,854,000 strings.
121
 This could provide a contrast to the rapid 
deterioration of economy after relocation of capital. 
Salt tax rate reduced in 1189. Salt produced from Baodi, Shandong and Cangzhou 
reduced from 38 wens per catty to 30 wens.
122
  Furthermore, vinegar tax was 
exempted in 1183.
123
 In 1190, the state reduced commercial tax rate totally, reduced 
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941,000 strings income. Also the state exempted the tax on renting market.
124
 Apart 
from reduction of commodes tax, in 1189 the state even reduced 10% grain tax for 
the whole state. The reduction rate reached 30% for low quality farm.
125
 The above 
tax reduction items on salt and commodes reduced more than 2,700,000 strings 
income, which was equivalent to incomes of one third of salt field, or twice amount 
of tributes paid from Song.
126
 At that time, the annual grain tax income was 9 million 
piculs.
127
 Thus the reduction of grain tax probably reduced about one million piculs 
grains income. 
 
Background of Tax Rise during the Reign of Zhangzong 
Due to the Mongolian invasion and flooding of Yellow River, Jin Dynasty’s 
economic status was rapidly deteriated. Jin Shi comments that the military 
expenditure was high during the reign of Zhangzong.
128
 Toyama Gunji’s research 
states that the war with Mongols damaged the economy. Furthermore the state also 
had to spend much income on managing Yellow River, which led to the financial 
crisis of the state. He analyzes that Zhangzong adopted a more cautious foreign 
strategy, especially on handling the Song’s provocation.129 Hearing that Jin was faced 
with various internal and external problems, Southern Song attacked Jurchen in 
1205.
130
 
 
Mongolian Invasion and Heavy Labour Work on Yellow River 
Since 1192, Jin prepared for the war with Mongols.
131
 The state increased the armies 
in northern border,
132
 the battle continued until the winter of 1198.
133
 Mongolian 
attack increased the expenditure. In 1194, the state mobilized 30,000 extra soldiers 
for the war.
134
 In 1195, the state sent 500,000 taels silver, 236,900 strings coins to 
border region for ordinary salary, there was another 50,000 taels of silver, 2,800 taels 
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gold bowl, 100 taels of gold medals, 8,000 taels silver medal, 1,000 colorful silk and 
446 set clothes were used as award. Xijing, Taiyuan and barbaric tribes was 
responsible for transportation of military resources.
135
 In 1196, the state offered 
another rewards to 20,000 northern soldiers with 200,000 tael of silver, 50,000 bolts 
of silk and 320,000 strings cash.
136
 Different from the war with Song, Jin could not 
gain the compensation from Mongols after the war. The properties of the affected 
region also largely reduced 20% in Xijing and Beijing. From the property survey 
after the war, 66,000 strings property tax income was reduced.
137
 Also, the defense 
construction was heavy.
138
  
In addition, Jurchen put a large number of labour units in dam reparation project 
since 1190s. The construction work was commented as “the largest scale amoung 
history”, as it involved 200,000 laborers and working 50 days annually within five 
years.
139
  
The military conflict with Mongols since 1190s and later with Song, together 
with the large scale reparation work on Yellow River created financial burden. 
The state adopted several ways to solve the economic problems. 
 
Tax Rise 
During mid Jin Dynasty, the state increased tax on salt brought the most significant 
effect on the increase of income for the state.
140
 Although the salt tax was dropped in 
1189, it rose shortly in 1195. Salt produced in the three salt fields in the Central Plain 
increased 10% to 33 wen.
141
 In 1199, salt tax in these 3 fields was further increased 
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to 42 wens per catty.
142
 This highly profitable product was to compensate for the 
cost.
143
Referred to the table “Changes of Official Price of Salt Produced” (in 
Appendices) in the northern salt fields, the price increased from 28% to 67% 
respectively.  Since 1204, all the seven salt fields increased the salt price to 44 wens 
per catty.
144
 It was a sharp rise of salt tax to Liaodong and Beijing salt fields with the 
increase of 3.5 times compared with five years ago. As the economic situation of Jin 
Dynasty was getting worse, the government adopted a more strict regulation to crack 
down on illegal production and selling of unpaid duty salt since 1206.
145
 It also 
allowed merchants to export salt to Song since 1208. 
146
  
Furthermore, the vinegar tax was imposed again in 1193 and turned permanently 
since 1198 respectively.
147
 In 1207, the state increased 1 % of the tax rate on 
commerce, gold and silver. Other commodes collected 3%.
148
 In 1204, commodes tax 
increased 1%, including wine tax. In 1207, gold and silver tax increased to 3%.
149
 
The military necessity tax was implemented to increase the income for military 
expenditure.
150
In 1198, the state raised the military necessity tax, as a supplementary 
to properties tax which was based on amount of properties. For the Central Plain, 
every string of new properties had to pay four strings of tax, for northern and 
northeast region the tax was halved.
151
  
 
Manipulation on Currency 
In addition, the state also obtained the money from issuing new currency and issuing 
large amount of paper money, mainly for military usage.The state started to issue a 
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new silver currency Chengan Baohuo in 1197.
152
 The purpose of issuing new silver 
currency was to procure money for military usage temporary.
153
 The increased issue 
of paper money also had similar function.
154
 The large amount of paper money issued 
led to inflation immediately.
155
  
 
Tea Ban Implemented 
Tea production was largely related to the excess of foreign import trading with 
Song. During the reign of Zhangzong, the state implemented a series of policies 
to tackle the problems and tried to overtake the income of tea from Song. 
In 1198, the state set up office to inhibit import of tea to prevent Song benefited from 
tea trading.
156
 In 1199, Shandong and Henan cultivated tea trees, and sold tea with 
600 wens per catty and taxed.
157
 The tea price soon declined to 300 wens five years 
later.
158
 In 1208, the ban relived slightly, stipulating that using Xiezhou’s salt in 
exchange in order to prevent negative effect on economy.
159
 After relocation of 
capital, there were even strict ban on tea.  
 
Mongols’ invasion devastated Jurchen’s economy. Fortunately the state still had the 
entire Central Plains as buffer. Thus the tax increase was relatively mild and affected 
only in short term, which was a large contrast to Xuanzong’s economic policy of 
increasing tax sharply. For example, Zhangzong particularly urged that the 
implementation on property survey in 1208 should be cautious. Discount for the 
newly increased properties tax should be provided, for the interest of state in the 
following ten years.
160
 Probably Zhangzong hoped to prevent the fled of households 
by heavy tax which caused greater damage to the economy. Secondly, the state 
carefully implemented policy to limit the inflation and prevent the exchange rate of 
currency out of control. During Zhangzong reign, despite the inflation, the state 
strictly controlled the amount of currency issued.
161
 In addition, soon after the war 
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with Mongols was over, the state immediately terminated the usage of Chengan 
Baohuo currency in 1200.
162
 Furthermore, in 1208 the state even recalled back the 
paper money through the means of tax collection.
163
 These measures helped the 
economy gradually recovered after Mongolian invasion.  Another feature was that 
Zhangzong implemented several measures to prevent possible disaster, including 
exempting peasants’ grains storage under property survey and reducing 20% of 
properties tax on farmland.
164
 Therefore, the state economy could recover in short 
term as commoners had sufficient grain storage. However, the storage could not 
benefit the state after relocation, probably due to the Mongols’ second invasion. 
 
Five years later Xuanzong also tried to implement similar economic policy 
through imposing tax and issuing paper money again, but the state no longer 
had enough economic resources. The tax rapidly increased and the economy 
was further worsened, and caused serious unfavourable consequences.  
In addition, although Weishaowang, Zhangzong’s successor was wicked and 
benefited from Zhangzong’s economic policy with large amount of storage in the 
Central Plain, the state could continue to relieve drought disaster and starvation in 
four circuits of the Central Plain in 1212.
165
 At that time the state had already faced 
Mongols and Xi Xia’s attack and lost large piece of territory. Four years before 
relocation of capital, the state could even offer Pingyang earthquake victims 3,000 to 
5,000 cash subsidy.
166
 Starting from 1214 after relocation of capital, the state only 
collected large amount of tax from commoners, but there was no more relief after 
natural disaster occured. It showed the importance of Zhangzong’s economic policy 
and the control of the northern Central Plain to the revival of state.  
 
Section 5 Political and Military Situation of Post Zhangzong era 
 
During the reign of Weishaowang (1208-1213), Jin was defeated by Mongols 
repeatedly. Mongolian attacked Hebei region since 1209 and the capital started to 
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implement martial law.
167
 In 1211, Genghis Khan commanded his army to invade Jin 
and approached Zhongdu region five months later.
168
 During Jin resisted Mongolian 
invasion, in 1213 Weishaowang was assassinated by General Hu Shahu, who failed 
to resist Mongols’ attack. Xuanzong then succeeded the throne. Later Hu Shahu was 
also assassinated with the same reason by Shuhu Gaoqi who later became the Prime 
Minister of Jin Dynasty. Shuhu Gaoqi’s defeat by Mongols may show that late Jin’s 
policy of passive defence strategy to Mongols was a complete failure. The attack 
from Mongols was increasingly intense. In 1214, most of the regions in Shandong 
and Hebei were lost to Mongols. Jin could only control the following prefectures 
including Zhendingfu, Damingfu, Qingzhou, Wozhou, Dongping, Xuzhou, Pizhou 
and Haizhou. Most of the prefectures and counties in Hedong (Shanxi) were 
destroyed.
169
 Zhongdu implemented commandeering grains policy from commoners. 
The emperor allowed people to donate grains to exchange for a post of an official. 
Also the capital city enforced martial law. It reflected the tense situation in the 
capital.
170
 Facing increasing threat from Mongol, Jin signed peace treaty with 
Mongols in return for Mongols’ retreat.171  
 
Unrest in Manchuria 
On the other hand, the region in Northeast was also highly unrested.
172
 As early as 
Ganghis Khan revolted in 1208, Mongols had already mobilized Yelu Liuge, 
adherent of Khitan to jointly attack Jin and occupied Dongjing (Liaoyang).
173
 
Xuanzong urged Puxian Wannu to garrison in Shenzhou and Guangning
174
  for 
defense in northeast for future retreat.
175
 Although Liaodong’s army defeated Yelu 
Liuge in 1215,
176
 Puxian Wannu’s in Liaodong army soon rebelled against Jin.177 
Shenyang, Dongjing and several important prefectures in Manchuria were occupied 
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by rebels.
178
 Cambridge History of China stated that “For the Chin state the loss of 
Manchuria, first to Liu-ko and Wan-nu and subsequently to the Mongols, was a 
severe blow because it cut off the remains of their state in China from their main 
horse-and cattle-breeding areas and from those regions with a substantial Jurchen 
population on whose loyalty they could have relied. As the situation was in 1215, 
Chin had lost not only the grain surplus -- producing areas of northern Hopei but also 
the regions from which they had obtained a great number of their cavalry horses.”179 
The situation deteriorated after relocation of capital. The loss of Zhongdu indicated 
the termination of connection with Manchuria. 
 
Red Jacket Bandits Unrest in Shandong 
Sheng Wu Qin Zheng Lu recorded that when Mongolian invaders could not took 
Zhongdu, Genghis Khan together with the prince attacked Hebei and Shandong 
region. They attacked a number of prefectures including Hejiangfu, Cangzhou, Jinan, 
and so on.
180
 Red Jacket Bandits or Song’s loyal and righteous armies, followed 
Mongolian invaders to attack Shandong.
181
 Since then, Shandong became highly 
unstable.
182
 The rose of Red Jacket Bandit could be traced back to Han Tuozou’s 
invasion in 1207, which Song’s authority stirred up Heshuo’s commoners rebel Jin. 
Despite the failure of Han’s northern expedition, once there was a disaster, bandits 
rose immediately.
183
 Groups of rascals robbed the region.
184
 For example, Li Quan, 
bandit leader had provided military aid in Song’s northern expedition in 1207.185 
Yang An’er, with originally about one thousand bandits, rebelled after Mongols’ 
attack.
186
 Shandong rapidly turned into chaos.
187
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Chapter 1 Relocation of Capital to Nanjing and the Situation of Heshuo 
after Relocation of Capital 
 
In 1214, the capital had been besieged by Mongols forces. Neighboring prefectures 
were destroyed. Grains in Zhongdu were almost used up.
188
 Also generals refused to 
accept military order because soldiers were spoiled by the precedent emperor 
Weishaowang.
189
 In addition, the Central Plains suffered from serious natural disaster 
from 1211 to 1214, leading to the sharp rise in grains price.
190
 That in turn stimulated 
a discussion on relocating the capital. 
 
Under the military threat from Mongols, Jurchen still kept several regions which 
were potentially the location of the new capital. After relocation of capital, Jin 
focused the defence on the sphere of Nanjing but ignored other regions, which 
eventually caused the loss of Heshuo again and rose of bandits.  
 
Section 1 Debating about Relocation of Capital 
 
Both the unrests in northeast and eastern part of the Central Plain shared a 
common feature: the rebellion force cooperated with Mongols to strengthen 
their power. Zhongdu was still under military threat. Furthermore, the state 
could not receive the grains supply backup from these two unrested 
regions.After Mongols invaders retreated, Hebei was destroyed. A number of 
officials suggested relocating the capital. There was a heated debate on whether 
moving the capital, and where the new capital should be located. 
 
Opinion 1: Relocate the Capital to Shandong 
Zhao Bingwen suggested that relocating the capital to Shandong because China did 
not have natural barrier in the north. Shandong was wealthy and convenience as it 
located in near Zhongdu. Through sea transportation it could get to Liaodong and 
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kept connecting Shangjing.
191
 In addition, Shandong could made use of river as 
natural barrier, and the concrete of the walled city and it was far away from the 
barbarians (Mongols).
192
 
 
Opinion 2: Relocate the Capital to Hezhong (Shanxi) 
Some court official suggested moving the capital to Hezhong region to strengthen the 
defence for the reason that it was closed to the five provinces near the passes. Also 
there were plenty of soldiers and horses. Furthermore, it had the barrier of Yellow 
River and three military towns in Hezhong, like Jiangyang, Pingyang and Taiyuan. 
Thus enemies could not easily attack. However, the dominant opinion in the court 
rejected the suggestion because it was located in Heshuo region and there was no 
palace there.
193
 It revealed that the court’s defense strategy largely depended on the 
natural barrier of Yellow River. 
 
Opinion 3: Relocate to Nanjing (Kaifeng) 
Furthermore, there were more officials who suggested moving the capital to Henan. 
Wanyan Bi, high ranking general suggested that there should be well-prepared for the 
planning of defence under the cease-fire agreement with Mongols, and consider 
relocate the capital to prevent the people suffering economic burden if Mongols 
invade again.
194
 He urged the emperor to move the capital to Nanjing, which can 
monitor the Yangtze River and Huai and hence defend the Yellow River. Also it could 
control Tongguan to strengthen the defence.
195
 Later, three high ranking Henan 
officials sent a proposal to emperor to urge for moving the capital to the Nanjing 
thrice. Xuanzong then accepted their proposal.
196
 The relocation of capital revealed 
that the state’s economy and security were fragile as it was geographically too close 
to Mongols. However, Natan Moujia opposed that idea because of the insufficient 
land and the lack of fertility in Henan. Also, it might risk the joint attack from Song 
and Xi Xia, and then Hebei would loss.
197
 He suggested dozens thousands soldiers 
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should fight with Mongol.
198
 Furthermore, there were four hundred university 
students who urged Xuanzong not to relocate the capital. However, their petition was 
rejected.
199
 
 
Section 2 Analysis on Policy on Heshuo Region after Relocation of capital 
 
Zhangzong had commented that the capital was the rite of the world.
200
 The place of 
capital setting was critical for the development of the state. The setting of capital is 
highly related to the economic development and even the fate of dynasty. The grain 
supply was an important consideration, together with the transportation of grains 
from neighbouring regions to the capital. It could be demonstrated through the 
policies adopted by Jin after relocation of capital. Shi Nianhai analysed the criteria 
for establishing capitals, including natural environment like climate, terrain, 
agricultural products and rivers together with economic factors, like population, 
agricultural production, and grain transportation.
201
 Thus, the relocation of capital 
was an important issue for the interest of the state. The military aspect was important, 
but it could not ignore the economic aspect.  
 
Loss of Zhongdu and Heshuo Destroyed 
After moving the capital to Nanjing, The mission of Zhongdu’s canals to transport 
the grains from Damingfu through Yu River to Tongzhou for Jin Dynasty 
completed.
202
 When the Mongols attacked Jin again, prefectures along the canals 
were under military risk, which  led to the starvation in Heshuo. Also, Henan and 
Shanxi was too far to support Zhongdu. The emperor soon recalled the Imperial 
Prince to Nanjing for defending Zhongdu.
203
 Before the fall of Zhongdu, Jurchen had 
tried to dispatch troops to relieve Zhongdu with grains
204
 but the garrison forces of 
the city surrendered and the grains could not reach the capital, thus people in 
Zhongdu resorted to cannabalism, and generals were fled.
205
 Later, the court also 
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refused to assist Zhongdu to prevent the loss of imperial troops. Thus Zhongdu was 
fallen.
206
 During the middle period of the reign of Xuanzong, the state’s policy was 
mainly defense, particularly in Henan and Shanxi region, due to the lack of power 
and Heshuo’s cities were destroyed.207 In 1217 Xuanzong claimed that he wanted to 
return to the capital to Zhongdu.
208
  This was just a good wish of Xuanzong. Even if 
the state would offer Prince Title for those local and loyalist generals who could 
recover Zhongdu,
209
 none could meet this target. Until 1218, Jin court continued to 
discuss the matter and aimed at connecting Manchuria region,
210
 but there was no 
any concrete plan. 
Mongols destroyed the entire Heshuo. They massacred all the inhabitants after 
capturing the city. All the treasures were confiscated.
211
 They captured all the 
resources once attacked a place.
212
  After relocation of capital, under the ruling from 
Prime Minister Shuhu Gaoqi, Jurchen did not have the plan to recover the lost 
land.
213
  Heshuo region left disrepair. In addition, Heshuo’s local officials planned to 
flee.
214
 Local prefectures and counties governors also fled to Henan.
215
 Furthermore, 
the state encouraged commoners to relocate to Henan,
216
 and later inhibit the new 
immigrants to return their Heshuo hometown.
217
 Cities there were implemented 
scorched earth policy,
218
 destroyed and burned everything, and retreated immediately. 
That in turn led to over 70% of grains damaged and therefore the anxiety of 
inhabitants. The military households lost their job as they abandoned their properties. 
Also the local people were also disturbed.
219
 For example, both soldiers and 
commoners in Hejianfu were ordered to move to Qingzhou for grains as it had 
become an isolated city.
220
 Zhangdefu (Anyang) was also abandoned by military 
generals.  Xuanzong agreed with the move as it was meaningless to defend a 
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indefensible city.
221
 Furthermore, the picked troops garrisoning in Heshuo had to 
assist Nanjing,
222
 which in turn undermined the defence of Heshuo region. Soon after 
the relocation of capital, Hebei already became ruined.
223
 Censor Xu Gu pointed out 
the retreat of military households affected the recovery plan of Heshuo region.
224
 The 
rapid retreat of armies in Heshuo and gave up the cities caused the raise of bandits 
and serious shortage of grains for loyalist army garrisoning in Hebei and Shandong 
region. 
 
Conferring Duke Title to Loyalist for Protection in Heshuo 
Despite the fact that Jin gave up the territory in Hebei and Shandong region, there 
were nine major local powers attempted to recover the lost land and prefectures. Wu 
Xian, loyalist of Zhending and Zhang Kai, loyalist of Qingzhou had the strongest 
financial and military power.
225
 At the beginning, the state continued to reward local 
power with 2,000,000 strings in order to eliminate Red Jacket Bandits.
226
 But of the 
lack of income, the state could only conferred loyalists high ranking of knight title, 
with full special rights.
227
 In 1216, the state decided to follow the footstep of Song by 
conferring official title to Li Quan, the head of Red Jacket Bandit,
228
 and high 
ranking knights to Jin Dynasty’s loyalists.229 These nine Dukes provided military 
service to the state, and acted as buffer of Henan. These nine Dukes were de facto 
warlords.They had high degree of autonomy, such as tax collection, laws 
implementation and recruitment of officials.
230
 Sometimes they even requested 
grains from the central government. Also they had discretion of make military 
decisions and whether accepting government’s order or not. Local officials were in 
no position to affect the warlord’s decision. 231  Although these loyalists offered 
voluntary military service to the state, the state reluctantly support them both in 
terms of finance and armies. The state also had no intention to improve the water 
transportation in Heshuo region for easier access of grains.  Loyalist Zhang Kai 
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garrisoned in Hebei, and urged for improving the river transportation in Anyang but 
rejected.
232
 Eventually there was a lack of grain supplies for his army. In addition, the 
limitation of grains supply in Heshuo also affected the grains supply to army 
garrisoned there. In 1214, the garrison forces in Heshuo region did not have enough 
grains support. For instance, Tian Zuo’s army were 2,500 people in size. They did 
not receive enough salaries, even though it was at the expense of commoner’s food 
supplies.
233
 Also, the court hardly assisted Heshuo’s loyalist, with the excuse of 
insufficient Henan soldiers.
234
 Thus, the achievement of loyalists was extremely 
limited. Later Wu Xian and Zhang Kai lost and surrendered to Mongols and Red 
Jacket Bandits respectively.  
 
Increased Intensity to Plunder Heshuo’s Resources 
In addition, the state set up various measures to grab the wealth from 
commoners in Heshuo. That caused serious starvation in the affected region. 
 
A year after the state relocated to Nanjing, the state implemented policy to collect 
80% tax of the transportation of grains from Henan to Heshuo through setting up 
customs along the Yellow River.
235
 Commoners, soldiers and even travelers could not 
directly transfer grains to Heshuo.
236 In addition, Xuanzong noticed Hebei’s 
commoners had large amount of cash.
237
 Thus, the court decided to strictly limit the 
grains supply to the region to increase the price of grains and obtain the money 
there.
238
 The policy led to the price of grains in Guanzhou and Cangzhou sharply 
rose to 10 tael of silver, and people resorted to cannabalism in 1216.
239
 Also, 
merchants could not gain benefit and did not transport the grains there. That led to 
starvation in Heshuo in the same year.
240
 In 1217, Xuanzong allowed to reduce the 
taxation, by just collecting half amount of grains transferring to Heshuo.
241
However, 
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it could not solve the problem of lack of available grains in Hebei in 1220.
242
 
Xuanzong’s policy caused hard lifestyle to people who stayed in Heshuo, thus 
increasing people joined the bandits to against Jin. 
 
Economic Loss of Losing Heshuo Region 
Hebei and Shandong were rich in resources. These regions did not only 
produced silk, but also the production ground of rare metal and salt which could 
yield large amount of tax income. The reduced territory decreased the financial 
income of the state.  
 
Loss of Silver Supply 
After Zhongdu fall, Jurchen lost all the silver mine. Treatises of Food and Commodes 
described since 1165 the state ordered Baoshan County to conduct silver mining to 
encourage the mining.
243
 During 1189-1208, the state opened up 113 of silver mine 
in Fengshan and Xiyinshan near Zhongdu.
244
 Treatise of Geography also provided 
that Daxing fu (modern Beijing) produce gold, silver, copper and iron.
245
 Yuan Yi 
Tong Zhi also recorded that silver and iron were produced in Wanping County of 
Dadu.
246
 It revealed that both Hebei and Zhongdu were the major silver production 
regions. 
Furthermore, Song stopped paying tribute to Jin also terminated the import of silver. 
It seriously affected the state’s  ability to reward the armies and officials. Chief 
Chancellor Desheng pointed out silk and silver used to reward soldiers.
247
 Part of 
soldiers’ salaries of was paid with cash as well. Thus, Jin Dynasty attempted to get 
back some of silver and financial support to the state, at the expense of peaceful 
relationships with the Southern Song.   
It could be proved that the lack of silver production in Henan affected Jin’s market 
trading. In 1215, there was a debate on using silver as currency on the cross-border 
market and collecting the tax directly from it. Prime Minister Shuhu Gaoqi pointed 
out that the ban of silver should be continued in border market, for the reason that 
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there was no silver mine within territoty after Mongols invasion and it could prevent 
further loss of silver.
248
 This source clearly pointed out that Jin did not have enough 
storage of silver after relocation of capitaland no longer be able to produce silver as 
the silver mining was not in the territory of the state. During Mid Jin Dynasty, silver 
was the major source of currency while coins were only limited supply. Kato Shige 
stated that Jin did not have the production ground of copper which was produced in 
Jiangnan region. Thus it had to use silver as currency instead, and paper money was 
used as supplementary.
249
 Therefore, after relocation of capital and losing silver, the 
rapid drop of the supply of rare metal and resources, seriously damaged the 
economic structure of state. The prohibitation of the  use of coins caused the rapid 
devaluation of paper money. That would be discussed in chapter 2 
 
Losing Baodi and Manchuria’s Salt Income 
During peaceful period, salt tax income was the most important and stable tax 
incomes of the state, as shown in the table “Income of Salt Tax in Different Places” 
listed in Appendices. After relocation of capital, Jin lost control to northeast and 
Zhongdu region, the loss of households and population reduced the state’s income 
from salt tax. First of all, the salt tax from Baodi supplying Zhongdu circuit, 
Liaodong, Beijing (Inner Mongolia) and Xijing (Datong) supplying northern and 
northeast regions lost. lossing 2,352,224 strings based on calculation of Jin Shi 
data.
250
  On the other hand, Jin also lost Shandong to Red Jacket Bandits, further 
losing Shandong and Cangzhou salt fields which could yield 4,334,184 strings and 
2,766,636 strings respectively. Jin only kept Xiezhou salt field and sent soldiers to 
protect this salt field.
251
 The huge loss of salt tax had to be compensated by other 
means. 
Jin Dynasty abandoned the territory in Hebei, just like providing the resources 
for enemies to attack back, enhanced expanding Mongols’ power. In 1230, 
Mongols Prime Minister Yelu reported to emperor that  
 
Your Majesty will have Southern Expedition. All the military cost came from 
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the Central Plains’ tax income, like land tax, commercial tax, salt, wine, mining, 
and the benefit from mountain and lakes. The government can gain 500,000 
taels silver, 80,000 bolts of silk and 400,000 piculs of grains for every year. This 
is plenty for supporting the army.
252
 
 
The above data showed Mongols conquered the northern part of the Central 
Plain, they could gain this amount of tax, already enough to support its southern 
expedition armies. 
 
Loss of Wealth After Relocation of Capital 
The loss of Zhongdu meant all the important storage of Jin Dynasty was lost, it was 
due to the relocation of capital was too sudden. Xu Gu commented that after losing 
Zhongdu, treasures stored more than hundred years were all lost.
253
 Song also noted 
that Jurchen left lots of treasures in Hebei.
254
 When Mongols overtook Zhongdu, the 
treasures in the palace originally owned by Jin were confiscated.
255
 Mongols General 
Samohe could sleep in golden bed and wore gold made shoes.
256
   
Furthermore, the grains storage was also lost. During mid-Jin Dynasty, when 
Zhangzong started the war with Mongol in 1194, there were still large amount of 
storage. Official reported that the state had 33,430,000 strings equivalent to two 
years expenditure, while all the 519 granaries stored 37,863,000 piculs of corns, 
which was sufficient for five years of expenditure of officials and soldiers. The rice 
storage was 8,100,000 piculs which was equal to four years of expenditure.
257
 After 
the loss of Heshuo’s territory and the intensity of wars with neighbouring regions, 
probably most of the storage used up or lost to Mongols through the loss of wars. 
Mongols used to drink milk and ate goats for their diet during their invasion, once 
they captured some cities in China they started to eat grains and rice as meal.
258
 After 
conquering the Central Plain, the Mongols obtained a stable source of grain supplies 
to provision their forces. 
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Chapter 2 The Development in Henan and its Economic Problems 
 
After the Mongols’ invasion and the relocation of capital, the economic status 
between Hebei and Henan shifted. In 1215, Gao Ruli commented that after Mongols’ 
invasion, lots of people died or fled away from Hebei and the economy and 
agriculture was seriously destroyed. On the other hand, after the emperor moved to 
Henan, it attracted lots of commoners to migrate there, and cultivated the virgin 
land.
259
  However, commoners did not feel secured after they moved to Nanjing. Liu 
Qi recorded that despite Nanjing was flourishing, it consistently had demons.
260
  
According to Yuan Haowen, “There must have propitious sign for a raising state, and 
there must have demons for falling state.”261 It is difficult to prove whether it had 
demons in Nanjing at that time, but it is sure that people did not have the sense of 
security, and they might think that it’s the sign of the fall of dynasty. In addition, Jin 
Dynasty put lots of manpower to defend Nanjing since there was no alternative place 
to flee. After Jin Dynasty moved to Nanjing, censor Wanyan Sulan urged the emperor 
to be more careful and should not make the same mistake again.
262
 However, the 
short sighted economic policy of the government after relocation of capital led to the 
doom of Jin Dynasty. 
 
Section 1 Migration and Immigrant Policies 
 
A. Relocating the Armies to Nanjing 
Jin Dynasty adopted a passive defend strategy after relocation of capital, and the 
armies retreated from Hebei to Henan. It not only affected the defense in Hebei, but 
also affected the economy in Henan. In the first stage, three hundred thousand 
soldiers originally garrisoned in Hebei relocated to Henan. The state ordered to 
preserve the power of army to protect Nanjing.
263
 The huge number of soldiers 
also burdened food supply. Despite the fact that some officials and even the 
emperor himself suggested it may be better for the army to garrison in the northern 
side of the Yellow River, Shuhu Gaoqi opposed the idea of protecting Hebei. In 1216, 
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around a million soldiers were in the state with their relatives receiving subsidy.
264
 
All these measures after relocation of capital created heavy economic burden for the 
state. 
 
B. Transferring the Relatives of Military Households to Henan 
Under the state policy, the relatives of military households were also forced to 
transfer to Henan. They had to abandon all their properties. According to Gao Ruli, 
the drawbacks include the abandon of the household’s farm and land, the difficulty of 
transfer, and rumours that would possibly lead to the instability of the society.
265
  
Feng Bi criticized the rush implementation of policy of retreat and migration created 
chaos and disturbances.
266
 The flowing population thus heavily burdened Henan and 
its economy.   
 
C. Transferring Commoners to Henan 
A lot of commoners fled to Henan, but could not settle for farming due to the 
shortage of farmlands. Neither were they allowed to return. Thus, a number of 
commoners suffered from starvation. 
Jin Dynasty immediately let the population to migrate into Henan after ceasefire with 
the Mongolss.
267
 In the following year, the state also urged local officials accept all 
commoners from Hebei to migrate to Henan and provided aid to them.
268
 Some of 
Heshuo people were recruited to the army. For example, 10,000 Xijing (Datong) 
refugees who moved to Henan were enrolled in army.
269
 The policy continued till 
1221 when the entire Hebei and Shandong region were almost lost. Moreover, most 
loyalists retreated to Henan due to serious starvation.
270
 
Apart from the above measures, the state also strongly encouraged the officials to 
accept more immigrants. For example, the officials who originally defected to 
Mongols and returned were allowed to be re-admitted in order to welcome all people 
to move to Henan.
271
 At the same time, the state rewarded to local officials who 
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could encourage immigration and increase the number of households.
272
 Moreover, Ji 
Wenlong relocated to Dengzhou region to escape from battlefield and moved to 
Southern Song later.
273
 
Wu Songdi’s research pointed out that most people moved from Hebei and Zhongdu, 
and some from Shanxi and they were mainly moved to Henan, and little of them 
moved to Shandong.
274
 He also proved that there were around three to four million 
people, including military households and commoners moved to Henan.
275
  
The state attempted to transfer the population, but there were not sufficient farmlands 
because the state put the priority to distribute lands to military households. For 
example, Song Zizheng migrated to Henan during the reign of Zhenyou (1213-1217), 
but returned due to insufficient spaces.
276
 Certain amount of military was not 
distributed farmlands, let alone commoners without properties. 
To prevent spy, Jin Dynasty banned commoners from southern bank of Yellow River 
to their Heshuo hometown since 1215.
277
 Wang Yi moved from Hebei to Henan 
during the reign of Zhenyou. However, he could not sustain his life. He planned to 
move to Linzhou to farm where the place had been fallen to Mongols. Wang was 
sentenced to death for treason.
278
 People were not dared to go back their hometown 
after they moved to Henan even if financially they could not support themselves. It 
partly explained the rise of bandit. 
 
Immediate Effects on Relocating Population to Henan 
Large amount of immigrants and commandeering of grains caused inflation. Since 
1214, as people from other provinces all gathering in Henan to buy, there was a sharp 
rise of grain’s price on the way the emperor Xuanzong travelling to Nanjing. Gao 
Ruli stated it was due to too many paper money issued and not enough grains 
available in market. He suggested encouraging commoners to contribute the 
grains.
279
 Thus, the state implemented the first commandeering of grains 
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immediately after relocating the capital to Nanjing in that year.
280
 Xu Gu stated the 
problems of garrisoning heavy armies in the capital affected the food storage of 
commoners.
 281
 To support the state’s extra expenditure on subsidizing military 
households, Gao Ruli suggested that double tax collected apart from ordinary tax.
282
 
As people were starving, they had to eat rubber or even exchange their children for 
diet.
283
 In addition, for commoners who moved to Henan under the policy of 
relocation, lots of them became jobless. Some even turned into bandits and created 
instability. The state probably intended to increase the manpower for farming, to 
contribute for tax, but there was not enough available farmlands for commoners, the 
jobless peasants turned bandits later further created trouble for the state. 
 
Section 2 Cost on Development on the Underdeveloped Henan 
 
As previously described, Henan was underdeveloped during mid Jin. After 
relocation of capital, most Jurchen and some commoners from Hebei were 
migrated to Henan. The state gave up Hebei and Shandong and devoted more 
resources to opening up Henan, including open up barren land for farming, 
develop wet paddy field, water transportation system and construct defense unit 
in Henan. However, the economic achievement could not cover up the 
development cost, and could not reach the consumption from the large amount 
of new immigrant.  
 
Open up barren land 
After relocation of capital, large amount of new immigrants arrived Henan. As most 
of high quality farmland were occupied, there were only grazing land, which was 
barren for long time and difficult to be cultivated. They did not have cattle and 
farming tools as well.
284
 Thus the state suspended the policy and continued to 
provide them grains subsidy.
285
 Gao Ruli also pointed out soldiers could not earn 
much from the distributed land and impossible to confiscate commoner’s land as 
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they had to pay triple tax together with heavy labour work.
286
 In addition, once 
commoners finished farming, they had to provide labour and transportation services. 
Thus they did not have spare resources to open up more farmland for military 
households.
 287
 Eventually, the court decided to encourage commoners to cultivate 
official barren land, and have of the reward was owned by them, the other half would 
turned into military households.
288
 Until 1220, six years after relocation of capital, 
some of military households still not yet distributed farmlands.
289
 The policy of 
distributing farmlands to military households affected the livelihood of commoners 
who rented the official lands. Half of farmlands in Henan were state owned land, and 
there were large amount of Henan’s commoners renting state owned farmland. Since 
1215, the tax was heavy for peasants for those years. Peasants would no longer rent 
the official farmland and reluctantly handover the land to army if there were further 
increase on the tax.
290
 The policy led to increasing amount of commoners fled.  
 
Implementation of Wet Paddy Field 
In addition, the state tried to promote wet paddy field in Henan for higher yield since 
1208. In Pizhou and Qizhou, 600 qin of land was cultivated, and the harvest was 
several times than ordinary farm.
291
 
In 1216, Cheng Yuan proposed to implement wet paddy field in Xishan County to 
collect 100,000 piculs tax by collecting one third from harvest. In 1221, Li Guorui, 
Nanyang governor reported that the place had opened more than 400 qin of farmland.
 
292
 Originally, the tax was three times higher than the ordinary agricultural tax which 
collected one tenth of income, but later the state decided to widely promote this 
policy to Shanxi, and the tax was the same as land field.
293
 In 1222, wet paddy field 
was further promoted to whole Henan region.
294
 
 
Discussion on Diverging Yellow River To Solve Land Crisis 
The serious shortage of available farmlands forced the court to consider 
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diverging the Yellow River to flow in a northern route, which was an original 
route after the capital moved the Nanjing for military strategy. 
Before Jin decided to move the capital, Zhao Bingwen suggested changing the route 
of river for defense. He suggested that reviewing Northern Song, Yellow River 
passed Hebei and Shandong, joining other rivers to the sea. The contemporary 
Yellow River flowed in southern way through Xuzhou, Pizhou. It was easy to diverge 
the route of river through small scale of construction then the river could follow the 
original path and merged Shandong and Henan together. Even if enemy invades, the 
natural barrier can block them.”295 In 1215, the following year after relocated to 
Nanjing, the court raised a debate on whether diverging Yellow River to the north. 
Yanzhan Tianze, governor of Shanzhou commented that it should make use of 
present’s dam to let the Yellow River flow in northern way as defensive strategy. The 
land originally covered by river would be turned into fertile land and could yield 
double the harvest. Otherwise, there would not be enough grain supply for soldiers in 
Henan, and the state would loss the population in Hebei and Shandong.
296
 Another 
Henan official Wensan Kexi of Yanzhou governor also suggested diverge the Yellow 
River to original route to increase the territory of Henan. He pointed out after the 
project, prefectures in Shandong and Damingfu would belong to Henan. Furthermore, 
there were half of prefectures in Hebei could be gained, for the defensive purpose 
and the foundation of recovering the state.
297
 This proposal was rejected by court 
officials, arguing that the route of river was difficult to control and defend.
298
 
However, through the discussion we could understand the serious shortage of lands 
and resources in Henan, due to the state gave up Heshuo region, and too obsessive to 
rely on the natural barrier of Yellow River. 
 
Development of Henan’s River and Canal Transport 
As analysed in previous chapter, river transportation was not common in Henan 
because Henan was a relatively poverty region during middle of Dynasty, Hebei’s 
river transportation was more important than Henan to transfer the grains to the 
capital. At the moment of relocation of capital, the river transportation in Henan was 
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not well developed. There was lack of vessels in the river for transportation,
299
 and 
even assisted by land transportation like cow and carts instead.
300
 
After moving the capital to the south, Henan’s river transportation became 
increasingly important for transportation of grains from Shanxi. Yuan Yi Tong Zhi 
recorded in 1214, Jin Dynasty diverge Jinshui River to Nanjing city.
301
 However, the 
scale was largely smaller than Northern Song era and also Zhongdu. The 
transportation of grains from Shanxi to Henan had been using land transport. There 
were mountainous areas in Hedong when the grains transferred from Shanxi to 
Henan,
302
 transporting 100,000 piculs grains annually to Nanjing.
303
 To increase the 
efficient of transporting grains from Shanxi to Henan, vessels were used although it 
risked Mongols’ attack to travel through Yellow River.304  
In 1223, the state followed to the past experience of Hebei’s canals and set up a 
granary in Guidefu to support the prefectures in eastern region.
305
Large vessels 
started to be built in the same year to increase the efficient and reduce the amount of 
labours. It could transfer 350 hu grains by each vessel, transferring 7000 hu by only 
using 100 sailors in few days to eastern region.
306
 At the same time, granary was set 
up in Biling County, through the use of a newly constructed canal to transfer grains 
from Wangan Lake to Bianjing and Sizhou for grains storage.
307
 
The grains supply for Henan took a higher priority than Hezhong or Shanxi region. 
Once there was deficient of grains in Henan, Shanxi immediately offered supply to 
the region.
308
On the other hand, even if there was starvation in Xiezhou, the customs 
in Shanxi and Hezhong did not allow the grains to transport to support Xiezhou.
309
 
People suffered from starvation and the granaries were emptied.
310
  Compared with 
the canals transportation around Zhongdu before relocation of capital, Shanxi’s river 
transportation’s scale was much smaller and lagged behind. 
Furthermore, the loss of Heshuo region even put river transportation was under threat 
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by Mongols invaders. In 1220, the emperor urged the prince to ensure the safety of 
transferring the grains from Zhongjing (Luoyang), the vessel had to be decorated as 
if transferring armies to deceive the enemy.
311
 Also, the vessels were ported in the 
southern riverbank if there was any military alarm.
312
 Quan Hansheng pointed out 
that the Grand Canals original used to connect Yangtze River and Yellow River. The 
confrontation between Song and Jin terminated this several hundred years’ old north 
and south transportation pathway. It no longer link up the military base and 
weakened the economic centre. The dispersal of power was not powerful to against 
the later rising nomadic Mongolian ethnics.
313
 After relocating the capital, Henan 
could merely provide sufficient resources to defend to Mongols and neighbouring 
three forces, but the southern expedition terminated the Jin and Southern Song to 
exchange for materials, including grains and other major necessity. 
 
Construction for Defensive Building 
After relocation of capital, the state aimed at retaining the sovereignty by 
keeping Henan, thus Jurchen decided to enhance the defence. However, it did 
not only consume much manpower without considering the affordability of the 
state, but also overly abused the commoners in Henan, which affected the 
agricultural production. 
Jin had spent lots of resources for constructing inner city, aimed at strengthened the 
defence. Shuhu Gaoqi claimed that Nanjing city having 80 square li was so large that 
was not easy to defence. Thus an inner city of Nanjing city wall with 40 square li was 
proposed to construct.
314
 In summer 1219, the state started to construct the inner 
city.
315
 The construction last for more than half a year until winter.
316
 The working 
progress delayed, seriously affected the agricultural production and even the storage 
in the granaries.
317
 Lots of houses were destroyed.
318
 The delay of work progress 
eventually increased the labours up to 100,000. During autumn, large amount of 
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workers were infected.
319
 After the project finished, the state offered subsidy to 
commoners for four months.
320
 As the construction undermined the productivity of 
Henan, the emperor Xuanzong knew the influence of construction work upon the 
economy of commoners, and eventually loss of the sense of security. 
321
 During the 
falling Jurchen in 1230s, Mongols’ forces entered Henan. The court decided to 
defend the outer city. However, the Mongols captured the outer wall, and no one 
could escape.
322
 Liu Qi commented that the strong outer city was constructed by 
Song. He criticized the stupid idea to build inner wall of Nanjing that when Mongols 
attacked, Jin Dynasty could not give up the other wall, so the inner city is useless.
323
 
In fact, the defensive ability of inner wall could not be tested, as the fall of city was 
due to starvation after being besieged by Mongols. 
In late Jin Dynasty, the state also put lots of effort to construct military unit. In 1224, 
the state constructed Zhongjing city (Luoyang).
324
 In 1225, the state spent several 
million labour units to construct military department office of Guide metropolitan 
prefecture (Shangqiu). Later the state only reduced one third of labour work.
325
 The 
intense labour work affected the productivity of commoners. 
Jin relocated the capital to the poverty Henan where the place developed too late, 
increased the burden of development expenditure. Despite the state put lots of 
effort to develop, the expenditure was even higher and there was no surplus for 
the state. 
 
Section 3 Economic Burden Created by Relocation of Military Households 
 
The state provided large amount of subsidizes to military households once they 
relocated to Henan. The purpose was to enhance their loyalty, which may also 
compensate their properties loss in Hebei region. It could be known through 
Xuanzong’s suggested that grains must be provided to military households to award 
them for their contribution to defend Mongols invaders. Either farmlands or grains 
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were supplied to them.
326
 In 1218, Zhang Xinxin described the state providing whole 
family of every soldier subsidy aimed at enhancing their loyalty, but created the 
burden of the state. He even pointed out the problems that some military households 
without man but still received subsidies.
327
 It showed the state waste lots of resources. 
After the government implementing the law of commandeering grains, all family 
members of a soldier would be subsidized to enhance the unity of soldiers. Also all 
of their family members were allowed to enter the capital. However, after several 
years they did not have enough to eat.
328
 Since 1222, the state implemented measures 
for military households in seven Henan’s prefectures, including Zhongjing 
(Luoyang), Tangzhou, Dengzhou, Shangzhou, Xuzhou, etc. to move to Jingzhaofu 
(Xian) and prefectures nearby to eat.
329
 It was probably Tangzhou and Dengzhou 
lack of grains supply after the failure of southern expedition. The farmlands 
distributed were far away, some were even several hundred li away from where they 
were garrisoned. Military Department commented it was not convenient for military 
households to farm themselves, so they had to hire someone to farm, and collect the 
rents in several hundred miles apart.
 330
 Thus the state suspended the policy about 
distribution of farmland to military households.
331
 It showed the drawback of 
relocating all the military households. Too much people received subsidizes from the 
state, spent up most of the grains of the storage in Henan and created economic. 
Later, the loss of Shanxi and Hezhong eventually further imposed burden on Henan. 
In 1331, the state relocated population from Jingzhaofu (Xian) to Henan before the 
place was attacked by Mongols.
332
 The loss of Jingzhaofu and the return of the 
population created the burden of grains supply of Henan again. 
 
Subsidizes to Military Households 
The state consumed large amount of grains to Jurchen military households. At the 
early stage, there was a larger amount of subsidy provided to military households. In 
1215, there were few millions population of military households fled to Henan.
333
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The government supplied every people with one litre of rice daily. The annual 
expenditure on this is 3,600,000 piculs. Half of the amount paid by cash money, it 
also need to pay 3,000,000 picul grains. In Henan, 240,000 qing (24,000,000 mu) of 
land was lent, while the income of rent was only 1,560,000 piculs. Therefore the 
emperor ordered officials to distribute barren land and grazing land, which could be 
cultivated to military households, with everyone 30 mou.
334
 
The regulation of monthly salary of ordinary soldiers before relocation of capital was 
one picul and seven pecks to seven pecks, depended on different types of soldiers.
335
 
The salary was provided per person. In addition, military households had to pay 
small amount of tax. It was different from the situation after relocation of capital the 
salary was provided for every family member, including elderly and child. Base on 
the average of 7.8 populations of every military household,
336
 with daily one liter of 
grains supply, the monthly salary for every household is 2 piculs and 3 pecks, which 
is 2-3 times higher than before. The military farm policy was not popular to some of 
military households. Some military households used to have corrupted lifestyle. 
Before relocation of capital, they drank whole day but not farm.
337
 Some also lend 
the farmland to others because they addicted to wine but cannot farm.
338
 Emperor 
tried to inhibit their practice but not success. Thus some military households did not 
farm.  When the state planned to distribute farmlands to them to replace subsidy and 
consulted them, their respond was to reduce half of subsidy rather than distribute 
them farmland.
339
 Some particularly worried that the implementation of military 
farming would affect their subsidy, thus Xuzhou and Suzhou armies particularly 
rejected this policy.
340
 In fact, before Jin conquered the Central Plains, every soldier 
had to farm without exception.
341
 However, their lifestyle turned corrupt and it was 
difficult for them to farm, particularly on the uncultivated land.Thus, the state 
                                                                                                                                          
households moved to Henan, suggested by other scholars on population history. 
334
 JS, 47, p. 1052.  
335
 JS, 44, p. 1008-1009.  
336
 According to Jin Shi, in 1183 there are 202 Mengan, 1878 Mouke, with 615,624 households and 
6,158,636 people. For this population, there were 4,812,669 ordinary people and 1,345,967 slaves. 
There were 1,690,380 qin farmland, and 1154313 livestock.  For each household, it had an average of 
7.8 ordinary people, (According to the Niu Tou Tax (Tax for military households), three cows unit 
equal to one tools) which had a slightly higher population density than ordinary households.  
337
 JS, 7, pp. 161, 179; 47, p. 1047. 
338
 JS, 7, p. 1047. 
339
 JS, 47, pp. 1053-1054. 
340
 JS, 15, p. 334. 
341
 JS, 44, p. 991.  
53 
 
continued to provide them subsidy, half by grains and half by money.
342
 In 1216, the 
court’s report that there were 448,000 populations under military household still 
receiving the grains subsidy.
343
 Assume that they received the minimum subsidy, that 
every people obtain just one liter of grains daily, the annual expenditure of the state 
was 1,635,200 piculs, which used up large proportion of income of the state. 
There was increasing demands from court and military officials, proposed the 
implement military farming policy for military households and reduce the 
expenditure by the state. In 1217, there were several hundred thousands of soldiers 
garrisoned in Henan together with several times of jobless relatives just opened their 
month for feeding. He urged for distribute farmlands to military households to 
soldiers, and reduce the size of armies. If the state could save one million soldiers, 
then it could reduce 3,600,000 million hu of grains annually.
344
 In 1221, there were 
still around 400,000 populations of elderly and children under military households 
living in the Henan and consumed the state 1,400,000 picul grains annually. They did 
nothing but just eating up the rent by other commoners.
345
  This amount of grains 
was equivalent to the annual storage by the state at that year, or the annual income of 
Jingnanlu (Southern region of Henan). However, the large consumption of grains by 
military households still not yet solved. Some soldiers with whole family including 
the elderly and teenagers who were originally unemployed joined the armies together. 
The reduction of soldiers might risk undermined the fighting will of the team,
346
 
because some family’s member combating together for the safety of their relatives.347  
In addition, some local military officials were highly corrupted and collect extra 
amount of subsidizes, wasting the state’s resources.348 
Jin had kept large amount of forces for defense, and the expenditure of sustaining 
large armies was high, particularly if we compared with Song. For example, in the 
last two years of Jin Dynasty, the state still had 200,000 armies around the capital, 
distributing to different generals. Also, their monthly salary was 1.5 piculs.
349
 The 
salary was five times higher than one liter ordinary daily salary of soldiers. We could 
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compare the situation with Northern Song. Based on Cheng Minsheng’s research, 
Northern Song’s entire number of army from 378,000 to 1,410,000 increased with 
time. Kaifeng capital mostly garrisoned 200,000 to 400,000 armies.
350
 In 1040, 
Shanxi garrisoned 300,000 soldiers which relied on the state to supply grains. 
Ouyang Xiu criticized this phenomenon that the national power must be weakened if 
there were 400,000 to 500,000 soldiers relied on the state to subsidize the grains.
351
 
After this comparison, Jin Dynasty had more than double, that was more than million 
populations of military household population received grains subsidize from the state. 
Also there was large amount of soldiers garrisoned around Nanjing, compared with 
the Northern Song. Thus it showed the high demands of grains from the huge number 
of garrisoned soldiers, together with the fewer resources and available farmlands, 
raised serious economic burden to the state.  
Officials strongly proposed military farm, however it was not efficient to gain high 
yields. We could compare the situation with Northern Song, referring to Zuo 
Chaoneng’s study. Northern Song implemented this policy for Hebei soldiers but 
they reluctantly cultivate the farms. The average production per person was less than 
2 piculs annually, and the average yield per mou was just around 1 picul annually.
352
 
Jin Dynasty forcefully implemented this policy affected the livelihood of tenants as 
their farmlands were recalled by the state. Eventually the production of grains in 
Henan region reduced and led to increasing number of commoners fled because they 
lost their land. Also the state originally collected Niu Tou Tax from military 
households, after relocation of capital there was no record on collecting this tax, but 
just offering them subsidizes. It showed the state reduced the tax income after 
implementing military farm. 
 
Tax Collection Could Not Reach the Demand of Military Expenditure 
There was continuous shortage supply of grains in Henan. Herbert Franke referred to 
Jurchen official Hou Zhi’s data to comment Henan’s agricultural production that 
“The intensity of agriculture obviously varied from region to region. Honan, in 
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particularly the area around Kai-feng, was the definite center of agricultural 
production. In 1219, when the territory of Chin had been drastically reduced, Honan 
had 1.97 million ch'ing of arable land, of which less than half, only 960,000 ch'ing, 
was cultivated…The total grain yield (millet and rice) in the state can be estimated at 
about 90 million shih per annum, one-tenth of which went to the government as land 
tax…In other words, the average yield from the lands in the whole state could just 
feed the population adequately”.353 Cheng Minsheng’s work further elaborated this 
point that the farm cultivated in Henan was three times more than the period of 
Northern Song. The development surpassed Northern Song.
354
 Despite the different 
perspective of their analysis, they pointed out the production was enough for 
expenditure, which I could not agree. 
Their dada referred to Jin Shi, recorded that in 1219, Hou Zhi, Minister of Three 
Divisions promotion of implementing military farm, and said, “All military and 
commoners in Henan had a total 1,970,000 qing of farmlands (197,000,000 mou). 
960,000 qing were cultivated. (96,000,000 mou)  High quality farm can harvest 1 
picul and 2 pecks per mou, middle quality is 1 picul and low quality is 8 pecks. 
Government collected 10% tax. Annually the government can gain 9,600,000 
piculs.
355
 
Hou Zhi’s argument’s context was to promote military farm. Both Herbert Franke 
and Cheng Minsheng ignored that the 9,600,000 piculs tax was just proved ideally 
assumed all the farmlands cultivated and had optimum harvest. Furthermore, if the 
land turned into military households, the state could not collect tax, thus the state’s 
income was not as ideal as Hou Zhi described, and quoted by Franke. It was not 
usual to increase of the annual income of the state six times compared with the data 
in 1215 that the income of rent only had 1,560,000 picul, mentioned by Gao Ruli. 
Here provide a data for the tax collection in 1222. In that year, Jingnanlu (newly set 
up circuits in southern part of Henan) had to provide 1,400,000 piculs to the 
capital.
356
 Local officials commented this target was difficult to achieve on time.
357
 
In 1221, Governor Shimo Wolu described originally 398,500 qing farmlands were 
cultivated, including 99,000 qing of government owned land in Nanjing Circuit. 
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However there were large number of people fled and the situation was similar in 
Jingdong, Jingxi and Jingnan Circuit.
358
  The fled of households already affected the 
income seriously. Thus, he suggested distributing the land for military households to 
reduce subsidy to them.
359
  
Also, in Henan there was large proportion of newly opened up barren farmlands, 
which would lower the yield. Also, in the flooding in 1220, the state could not relieve 
the victims. Only half of tax income was from Henan.
360
 In addition, they ignored the 
extra consumption of grains due to the war with neighbouring regions. The lack of 
economic foundation forced Xuanzong rejected the Department of State Affairs’s 
suggestion to increase military storage in that year. Instead he ordered to reduce the 
size of armies because the tax created maximum burden of commoners.
361
 The 
economic problem was so serious that the state preferred to reduce the burden to 
commoners rather than strengthening the military. 
We can also compare this source with the reign in Dading (1161-1189). At that 
period the state had all the territory including northeast, Shandong, Hebei region, and 
collect the same amount of tax compared with the reign of Xuanzong to show the 
heavy tax during the reign of Xuanzong. Shizong commented that the annual income 
of the state was 9,000,000 piculs. 2,000,000 piculs of the income were reserved for 
relief during natural disaster.
362
  At that time, there were nineteen circuits in the state. 
In average, around 470,000 piculs grains collected for each circuit. Circuits in the 
Central Plain might collect a higher proportion. After relocation of capital, Jin lost 
control to at least eleven circuits, including Hebei, Shandong and Manchuria region 
which were the important region of grains production. If Herbert Franke quoted Hou 
Zhi’s data was true, then Henan and the western region both responsible for 
4,500,000 piculs of tax, which was about ten times increase. Although officials 
commented the tax was three times increased after relocation of capital, it might not 
reach ten times increase within ten years. 
The economy just seemed to be improved in 1223, with 1,800,000 piculs grains 
storage, which was three times than previous year, probably with the effective 
economic policy. The official commented the storage was sufficient for the state, but 
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the heavy levies caused the fled of households.
363
  
 
Table 2: Tax Collection Could Not Reach the Demand of Military 
Expenditure 
Year Annual 
income 
 Sources 
1219 9,600,000 
piculs 
The total amount of farmland in Henan 
was 1,970,000 qing. High quality farm 
could collect 1 picul 2 peck, average 
was 1 picul while low quality farmland 
was eight pecks. The tax collected one 
tenth, annual income was 9,600,000  
JS, 47, p. 
1055.  
1161-1189 
(Reign of 
Dading) 
9,000,000 
piculs 
Annual collection was 9,000,000 piculs 
(Whole Nation)歲取九百萬石 
JS, 47, p. 
1057 
1215 1,560,000 
piculs 
240,000 qing of Henan under rent, 
annual income was just 1,560,000 河南
租地計二十四萬頃，歲租才一百五
十六萬 
JS, 47, p. 
1052 
1222 1,400,000 
piculs 
(Jingnanlu 
only) 
Now southern circuit had to transport 
1,400,000 piculs grains to the capital, 
and grass 4,500,000 bunches 今南路當
輸秋稅百四十餘萬石，草四百五十
餘萬束 
JS, 47, p. 
1062 
    
1220 N/A Now there is flooding in Henan, lots of 
people fled, less than 50,000 qing 
wheat cultivated, less than half of 
ordinary year 今河南罹水災，流亡者
眾，所種麥不及五萬頃，殆減往年
JS, 47, p. 
1055 
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太半 
 
Expenditure on military households after relocation of capital 
Year Amount of 
expenditure 
  
1215 3,600,000 piculs Several million populations of Hebei military 
households relocated to Henan, every people 
gain 1 litre, annual expenditure is 3,600,000 
piculs. Part of them pay by cash, the state 
also had to spend 3,000,000 piculs 河北軍戶
徙居河南者幾百萬口，人日給米一升，歲
費三百六十萬石，半以給直，猶支粟三百
萬石。* 
JS, 47, 
p. 1052 
1216 1,635,200 piculs 
(Assume every 
people receive 1 
liter grain) 
Now 448,000 population of military 
households should be offered grains 今軍戶
當給糧者四十四萬八千餘口 
JS, 47, 
pp. 
1053-
1054. 
1221 1,400,000 piculs 
(on old and child 
military household 
only) 
For Jingnan, Jingdong and Jingxi three 
circuit, there were 400,000 old and child 
military household population, costing 
1,400,000 grains expenditure 京南、東、西
三路，屯軍老幼四十萬口，歲費糧百 四十
餘萬石 
JS, 47, 
p. 1055 
 
* Note: There might be incorrect for several million population of military 
households to Henan, the number probably be around one million, as described 
in the compiler’s notes. (JS, 47, p. 1053) 
 
Section 4 Increased Tax Collection to Cover the Expenditure 
 
Increased Miscellaneous Levies 
The worsened economy of the state compelled the court to implement miscellaneous 
59 
 
levies. The compilers of Jin Shi commented that late Jin Dynasty suffered the most 
serious shortage of economy.
 
Despite Jin aimed at implement policy concerning 
commoners, the policy was serious which could not increase the wealth of the state. 
The fall of Jin Dynasty was due to the heavy tax implemented, including the 
commandeering of grains and obtaining grains from customs, to amass resources 
from commoners
364
  Liu Pujiang had stated that Jin Dynasty had three ordinary tax, 
including land tax, properties tax and tax on commodes. The taxes other than the 
above three types of tax were miscellaneous levies, usually implemented in specific 
regions under special situation, usually in warfare.
365
 According to Liu Pujiang’s 
research, more than twenty miscellaneous levies imposed to collect money in 
different names.
366
He also pointed out Jin Dynasty economic foundation were 
destroyed in Hebei, led to the loss of large amount of tax on commodes. The deficits 
were compensated by these ten types of miscellaneous.
367
  
The military necessity tax imposed after relocation was one of the heavy taxes to 
collect from the military expenditure. Once the storage of the state could not afford 
the expenditure on military, then the military necessity tax implemented.
368
 The tax 
on “Horses cultivation” and “military necessity” collected in the reign of Zhenyou 
was aimed at collecting silver to balance the value of paper money to enhance its 
circulation.
369
 It showed the state aimed at collecting the silver from the public 
through the implementation of this tax. 
 
Increased Properties Tax 
After relocation of capital, the state started to do property survey, commoners hid 
their properties and fled to escape tax. Gao Ruli urged the state should not do the 
property survey immediately to prevent affecting farmers.
370
 Also, heavy tax was 
imposed on cattles during 1218. Thus farmers hid their cattles and affected 
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agricultural production. Thus there were large piece of barren land in Xincai.
371
 In 
addition, the state further imposed tax on population, properties and ability of 
reproduction, to provide the necessity for military usage. Part of commoners fled 
because they could not afford the burden.
372
 Thus, the state imposed a heavy tax 
eventually affected agricultural production and the collection of tax. 
 
Collection of Double Amount of Grain Tax 
Apart from collecting miscellaneous levies from commoners to compensate for large 
amount of military expenditure, Emperor Aizong also collected double amount of 
summer grain tax in 1228, after Mongols attacked Pingyang
373
 It showed the lack of 
storage of the state. Different from previous experience, the collection of extra tax 
was in both grain tax and money tax, to obtain the grains from commoners in short 
time. 
 
Other Means to Collect Money 
Jin Dynasty also confers official title to those who donated the grains. Starting from 
1214, the state set up the regulations on donation of grains to obtain confer of official 
title. For ordinary people who donated from 150 piculs to 20,000 piculs could receive 
different rewards.
374
 Two years later, the state even allowed middle aged empirical 
examination candidates aged 45 or above to donate for graduated title.
375
 In addition, 
the state also accepted temples and monks and Taoist priest to donate for official 
conferred title and religious official position. The amount required was 10 piculs to 
70 piculs annually, depended on the classes.
376
 
 
Proposed to Tax on Cooking Oil Production 
To further seizing the resources from commoners to support the expenditures of the 
state, some officials even proposed to tax on cooking oil to obtain several hundred 
thousand taels of silver, which was nearly equivalent to the amount of tribute paid by 
Song. It showed the greed and urgency of the state to obtain money from commoners. 
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Wang Sanxi, Tax Minister, proposed the idea and was supported by Shuhu Gaoqi 
based on the large expenditure of the state.
377
 The purpose was to obtain dozen 
thousands taels of silver annually.
378
 
This proposal raised heated debate. Gao Ruli refuted that after started the war with 
Mongols, the tax in Henan rose several times, and there was further extra tax on 
different items and labour services, all were collected from commoners. In fact, 
taxing on oil the state could receive several hundred thousand taels of silver annually, 
but the tax came from commoners, it further increased their burden.
379
 There were 26 
officials who supported Shuhu’s proposal, including household minister, vice 
military of labour and Kaifeng governors. On the other hand, several court officials 
and Transportation official in Nanjing Province opposed the idea. The opposite 
opinion basically argued it was nonsense to prohibit the use of commonly used 
commodes, which was never happened in the previous dynasty.
380
 Thus the emperor 
turned down the proposal.
381
 
Actually, the proposal seems ridiculous, but there were still a number of court 
officials supported it. The proposal showed the characteristic of the greedy and 
short-sighted policy and the state was seriously lack of resources. 
 
Issuing of Paper Money 
Compensate the Military Expenditure  
The major reason for Jin to implement paper money was to compensate military 
expenditure. Jin Shi recorded that eighty-four carts of goods for military reward were 
used in the battle of Huihe 會河之役 against Mongols’ invaders in 1211. The result 
was a disaster, but the government did not have intention to solve the economic crisis. 
The value of banknotes was so low that it could hardly be used in the market. 
382
 The 
problem was worsened after relocation of capital. Furthermore, there was frequent 
warfare. This led further devalue of currency.
383
  
 
Rapid Devalue of Paper Money 
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The state lost the source of silver after relocation of capital. It had to increase the 
intensity to collect money for military expenditures on increasing wars, thus the state 
started to issue paper money and banned the usage of coins gradually to increase 
collect the wealth from public. Starting from 1215, the paper money gradually 
replaced the coins. The usage of coins was fate out to ensure the circulation of paper 
money.
384
 The banning of using coins aimed at manipulating the value of paper 
money with issuing a new one in order to obtain more silver from the public.
385
The 
value of paper money immediately dropped because it could not exchange for coins, 
but it affected of business activities and even affected the selling of grains in capital. 
Different from Song, Jin implemented paper money without offering interest, but it 
collect raw material fee 15 wen per strings.
386
 There was no expire date on the paper 
money, but the state assumed commoners renew it half year.
387
 There were nearly ten 
types of new paper money issued after relocation of capital. Every paper money had 
the similar feature that it had high value at the beginning, but devalued soon. At the 
beginning of relocation of capital to Nanjing, a banknote Jiao Chao of ten strings 
(10,000 wens) could only exchange for ten wens.Other types of paper money ranged 
from 20 strings to 1000 strings. Usually one year after the issue, then the paper 
money devalued to worthless.
388
  Later even it was made by silk called Zhenhuo and 
Diyin, but the frequently changing different paper money continued until the fall of 
state.
389
.
390
  
Most of the paper issued in the reign of Xuanzong, showed under his reign the state 
increased the intensity to collect from commoners. In 1222, the state issued 
Yuanguang Zhenhuo, together with silver as the legal currency.
391
 This was an issue 
to collect silver from commoners.  
 
Collecting Capitals for Paper Money 
To balance the over-issued paper money, the state imposed a tax named as “mulberry 
paper money tax”. The state first collected 70,000,000 strings tax from public to 
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support the annual expenditure. Later the Tongbao turned stagnation of circulation, 
double the stated collected double amount.
392
 All these just happened within the same 
year 1217 when the state started war with Song. Commoners did not only suffered 
from devalue of paper money, but also had to pay the price of bad economic 
management of the state.  
 
Affecting Market Trading 
Jurchen strongly prohibited commoners criticizing monetary policy since mid Jin 
Dynasty.
393
 After relocation of capital, although the rapid devalue of paper money, 
commoners were forced to use it.
394
 To strongly implement paper money, the 
government stipulated that one tael of silver could not exceed 300 strings of the 
value of Bao Quan. For the goods which the value is lower than three taels could not 
use silver. For the goods with higher value, only could be paid by one third value in 
silver, others had to pay by paper money. Anyone who ignored the regulation 
received punishment. After the order implemented, the market closed and business 
activity stopped.
395
 Also, after relocation of capital and the state used paper money to 
replace coins, giant merchants suffered most as they lost most of their properties due 
to the change of banknotes system.
396
 The frequent changing paper money seriously 
affected business activities. 
Similar to other policies implemented by late Jin, the frequently changing of paper 
money and forcefully collecting capitals eventually exceeded of commoners’ effort 
and they fled. The paper money also reduced businessman’s capital and hit the 
commercial activities. Gao Ruli stated the problems that if the commoners fled, it 
would further worsen the military storage and the paper money system. The 
consequence was more far-reaching than devaluation of paper money.
397
 However, 
the state continuously manipulating the value of paper money through rapidly issue 
new one showed Gao’s opinion was not accepted, and there was fled of households 
continued, joined the bandit and became rebellion force. These heavy taxes similar to 
killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.  
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It could Jin had to wage war with Song just for collecting back the tributes to 
solve part of its economic problems.  
 
Section 5: Heavy Tax and Economic Problems Led to Fled 
 
The heavy labor works and tax caused serious financial problems to ordinary people. 
In 1215, Censor Tian Jiangxiu 田迥秀 reported to emperor that all the funding of 
military and the state was responsible by Henan. Local officials did not concern the 
affordability of commoners and tax collected in short period. For those who could 
not pay the tax was punished by hitting with sticks. Commoners emptied all their 
properties but still insufficient to pay tax. So they fled to other place. They used up 
their money. Families were separated and died. Government tried to prohibit it but 
cannot stop the problems.
398
 The hard life of commoners could be seen in the work 
collections and writings by contemporary scholars. For example, Zhang Dehui’s 
family lost all their properties after the war started in the reign of Zhenyou.
399
  In 
1217, two third of Henan’s peasants households could not fulfill the amount of tax 
payment that year. They had to sell the grains they eat in order to pay enough amount 
of tax.
400
 In 1220, the state had sufficient storage, but the problems of the escaped 
households still existed. Also the military tax was too high threatened refugees to 
return their hometown and resume their work.
401
  
Eventually, the heavy tax was several times of the past, caused the fled of households. 
In Bozhou, there were only one tenth of households existed, while other fled.
402
In 
Caizhou and Xizhou, 80-90% of households fled. Chenzhou and Yinzhou, 100 li 
from the capital only had few amount of households. The agricultural production was 
abandoned, but there were rising of bandits. Officials commented the rise of bandits 
was due to heavy tax and labour work.
403
 In addition, the tax originally had to pay by 
the fled households turned into existing one.
404
 Thus there was slippery slope effect 
for the population to flee.  The significant effect of the fled of households was 
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seriously affected supply to armies.
405
 Furthermore, the heavy tax and the famine in 
Suzhou led the fled of households. The consequence was the lack of grains supply in 
Guidefu, Pizhou, Suzhou, Xuzhou, Sizhou.
406
 The lack of grains supply was one of 
the cause led to the military failure. Song’s source pointed out part of them fled to 
Song to contribute for Song’s military farm and later attacked back.407 
 
State Lack of Relief on Flooding after Relocation of Capital 
In addition, through analyzing the state’s relief policy to the serious flooding in 
Henan, we could notice the heavy tax of the state, together with the lack of 
ability for the state to provide aid. 
In Appendices section, we could know that there were two serious floods in 1216 and 
1220 after relocation of capital. The flooding in 1216 affected the eastern part of 
Henan. The affected region had serious starvation, together with the heavy supply to 
Pizhou’s soldiers preparing for southern expedition, led to the fled of households.408 
The state only exempted 160,000 piculs tax of escaped households in Zhongjing 
(Luoyang), Songzhou and Ruzhou.
409
 On the other hand, the flooding in 1220 
affected around ten prefectures in Henan and seriously affected agricultural 
production. The flooding forced more households in affected region fled.
 410
 The state 
exempted the grains tax, purchase of grains, labor work and mulberry paper money 
tax.
411
 For example, the state exempted 100,000 piculs grain tax in Bozhou.
412
 
However, the state could just do these policies to relief the burden of victims. 
Different from the flooding occurred in the reign of Dading and Zhangzong, the state 
could not offer aid to the affected region. It could only encourage wealthy people to 
offer loans to peasants.
413
 Only two years later, the heavy tax returned, Jingnanlu 
(southern Henan) had to respond for 1,400,000 piculs autumn tax without any 
exemption.
414
  Through the Jurchen court’s respond to natural disaster, it showed the 
military expenditure damaged the economy seriously, and could not offer significant 
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relief to victims as before. 
On the other hand, during that period Song provided plenty grains and medicine to 
victims of flooding in Shandong and border region.
415
  Furthermore, Song’s emperor 
accepted refugee from Jin,
416
 and Meng Zongzheng, Song’s Xiangyang general 
recruited dozens thousand immigrants from the Central Plain (Jin), provided them 
subsidizes, distributed them farmland and implement military farm.
417
 Huai region 
and the Central Plain were geographically closed, but there was a great contrast of 
commoners’ social welfare between Song and Jin. The increasing number of people 
in Jin fled to Southern Song showed the failure of economic policy of Jin, and the 
serious consequence Jurchen would face. 
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Chapter 3: Southern Expedition (1217-1224) and Relation with Economy 
 
Relocation of capital, the worsened economy and southern expedition is 
interrelated. It was raised by Song terminated paying tributes to Jin. It was also 
based on limited resources of Jin and increased expenditure after relocation of 
capital, including the stipend on military households and the combat between 
Mongol and Shandong bandits. Thus, Jin invaded Song during 1217-1224. 
Song refused to pay tribute to Jin after Jin relocated the capital, Jin Dynasty started 
to discuss on invading Song from 1215. Song’s historians commented Jin invaded 
Song was due to the loss of territory.
418
 Jurchen historians also had similar arguments, 
but they further criticized the southern expedition.
419
 Yuan Haowen criticized that the 
military strategy was not workable for ressisting the powerful enemy, but only 
suitable for plundering Southern Song through southern expedition.
420
 Liu Qi 
commented that after moving the capital to the south, it frequently attacked Song. 
Because the territory in Henan and Shanxi was small, it planned to capture the land 
in Jiangnan. He criticized that Jin could not preserve its property but only could plan 
to deprive from others. Furthermore, the war continued for years without any 
significant progress.
421
 Compiler of Treatise of Food and Commodes also lamented, 
quoting the Zuo Zhuan that “If there is not enough foundation to collect tax, then the 
state had the problems of greed. If the state was based on greed, what the problems 
would be like.
422
 These commentaries could provide an alternative view for us to 
consider Jurchen’s pretext for invading Song, which was largely related to relocation 
of capital and the economic crisis. Even though Xuanzong later claimed that 
invading Song was due to the breaching the settlement of Southern Song and not for 
the territory,
423
 it was clearly that Jin’s southern expedition planned to regain the 
tribute from economic perspective. With the pretext that Song’s bandit, which in fact 
was largely rascals and Jurchen’s refugee, and Song’s refusal of paying tribute, 424 
Shuhu Gaoqi considered invading Song to compensate the lost in the north.  
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Section 1: Southern Song Terminated Paying Tribute to Jin 
 
Briefly Analyzing Jin-Song Relation before 1217 Southern Expedition 
After Jin relocated the capital, Song already noticed the problems faced. Song clearly 
understood the politics in Jin and also Mongols invaders through the intelligent from 
Xi Xia, Shandong and Mongolia. Song court noticed that Jin’s strength was 
weakened.
425
 Starting from 1214, Jin sent envoys to announce the news of relocation 
of capital and urged Song to pay back the tribute.
426
 This issue stimulated discussion 
in Song court.  
In fact, Song was alert to Jin after its relocation of capital and well prepared for 
defence.
427
 The Song court asked for proposal to respond to Jin.
428
 The public 
opinion from Song was almost one sided: to refuse paying tribute. Zhen Dexiu, who 
he had been envoy to Jin in 1212, first urged the state to stop paying tribute. At that 
time Mongols’ was invading Jin, he witnessed the corruption of Jurchen.429 Zhen and 
Lou Yue had similar ideas to terminate tributes and prepared defence in Huai 
region.
430
 Imperial University students even protested for sending envoys to Jin.
431
 
Some were angry that Jurchen polluted Song’s old capital, and it would be shame to 
send envoys to there.
432
 Some looked down upon Jurchen after relocation of capital, 
arguing that the Song no longer had obligation to pay the tribute to Bian 
(Kaifeng).
433
Some even noticed Jin already suffered economic problems and noticed 
that Jin’s valuable item was stored in Hebei, and predicted Jin was faced with 
unfavourable consequence as Henan did not have natural barrier.
434
 General Zhao 
Fang, Jia She and Chu Yuzhi all predicted Jin would attack Song, as Jin was already 
suffered from Mongols’ attack.435 Jia She even pointed out that Jin had used up its 
money and grains. He suggested Song not to return tribute to Jin to prevent 
strengthening Jin’s power and attack Song again.436  Shi Miyuan also agreed the 
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installation of military defense and storage of grains to prepare.
437
 
Qiao Xingjiang, on the other hand, suggested that “If one of two interdependent 
things falls, the other is in danger”. He argued that Mongols was raising, its power 
was strong enough to eliminate the Jurchen. The Jurchen, once had been the Song’s 
enemy, became the barrier of greater enemy now. Song and Jin shared the common 
lots, and should temporary provide Jin tribute to enable Jurchen to resist the Mongols.
 
Shi Miyuan nearly accepted his long term plan. However, a group of university 
students urged the court to prosecute Qiao Xingjian for his suggestion.
438
 
Contemporary scholars Lu Zhong also strongly criticized Qiao’s suggestion.439 
Since the public opinion supported Zhen Dexiu’s suggestions that not to pay tribute 
to Jin, Shi Miyuan decided to accept the opinion from majority. In fact, in 1215 
Song’s emperor had requested Jin to reduce the amount of tribute, but Xuanzong 
rejected the request.
440
 In 1215, Song rejected Jin’s envoys in Huai Region, thus Jin 
prepared to invade Song.
441
 
 
Evaluation on the Amount of tribute 
Because Jurchen used the pretext that Song did not pay the tribute for invading 
Song, the following  will analyse the evaluated amount of tribute in Jin Dynasty 
economy.  
 
Table 3: Evaluation on the Amount of Tribute 
Items Evaluated 
Value 
 Sources 
300,000 
taels silver 
600,000 strings One tael of silver 
equal to 2 strings 
遂改鑄銀名「承安
寶貨」，一兩至十兩
分五等，每兩折錢
二貫 
JS, 48, p. 1076.  
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300,000 
bolks of 
silks 
750,000 strings High quality silk was 
2 strings 500 wen, 
one tael of silk was 
250 wen, in Anyang 
問絹帛價，雲好絹
每疋二貫五百文，
絲每兩百五十文” 
Lou Yue, Daily Records 
on Traveling to the North 
樓鑰，《北行日錄》，in 
Zhao Yongchun edited, 
Records on ambassadors 
travelling to Liao and Jin, 
(趙永春編，《奉使遼金
行程錄》) Chang Chun: 
Jilin Literature and 
History Publisher, 1995. P. 
266.  
Total 1,350,000 
strings 
  
 
Notes:  
1. The silver price is constant, while the price of silk is 1170 
2. There might be inflation of silk’s price, particularly after Jin’s lost Hebei, 
the major production region of silk 
 
The total amount of tribute that Song paid to Jin was roughly worth 1,350,000 strings. 
Since silk was produced mainly in Hebei region,
442
 the value would be higher due to 
lack of resources and loss of production ground in Hebei probably further increased 
the value. At that time, the state imposed ban on drinking tea for saving several 
hundred thousand taels silver annually. Thus this tribute was an important source of 
Jin’s financial income of late Jin.443 Chan Hok-lam stated that Jin Dynasty used 
valuable products like silk and silver, mainly from Song’s tribute, to exchange for tea. 
Song’s manipulation on the market and price of tea could get back the lost from the 
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tribute. However the northern territory lack of resources thus Jin had to rely heavily 
on South.
 444
 Since Song stopped paying tribute to Jin, to prevent the net loss of silver 
and silk, Jurchen had to prohibit purchase of tea.
445
  
At the same time, Jurchen lost most of the sources of silver, as Hebei’s silver 
mines were lost to Mongols. Therefore, Song’s refusal of paying tribute further 
undermined Jin’s economy. 
 
Section 2 Jin’s Decision to Invade Song 
 
The discussion on whether invading Song or not two years after Jurchen 
relocated the capital mainly based on economic consideration, while some 
arguments was about preserving the dignity of the state. There was a heated 
discussion in the court of Jin Dynasty. Lots of censors and some generals who 
have good understanding of Song opposed to invade Song; while Prime 
Ministers and several generals who had participate the southern invasion during 
the reign of Zhangzong supported the invasion. The following will provide an 
analysis on this issue to discuss the economic loss of the deterioration of 
relation between Song and Jin. 
 
A.  Pro-war Opinions 
There were several generals and Jurchen officials suggested to start a war with Song. 
Shuhu Gaoqi strongly urged the court to invade Song after receiving the suggestion 
from Wang Shian to invade Xuyi and Chuzhou, and summoned Song and Red Jacket 
Bandit to surrender. Shuhu Gaoqi had participated in invade Song during 1206, 
eliminated dozen thousands of Song’s armies and received large amount of military 
awards.
446
 In 1217, Shuhu Gaoqi urged the Jin court to invade Song to increase the 
territory of Jin. Xuanzong originally rejected the idea, as he commented that he just 
wanted to keep the ancestor’s heritages.447 Natan Moujia also suggested invading 
Song.
448
 However, in summer the emperor ordered to attack Song and send the 
general Wugulun Qingshou and Wanyan Saibu to prepare invading Song. From that 
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moment the Song Jin relationship terminated forever.
449
 
 
B. Anti-War Opinions 
The opposite opinion was also based on economic consideration. The court officials 
mainly pointed out Jin might not successfully gain from southern expedition. 
Furthermore, some even comparing Song’s situation and analysed Jin might face the 
loss of war. For example, Prime Minister Li Ge pointed out the state should maintain 
peace to enhance the storage. Otherwise, the state could not afford any invasion.
450
 
Some officials commented the weaken Jurchen might not gain victory. Minister Yang 
commented that Song had large amount of resources backup in Sichuan and Jiangnan 
region. Jin might not win again as the southern expedition in 1206-1207. He warned 
that Jin’s southern expedition would invite Mongols’ attack again and Jin might be 
facing a two-front war.
451
 Yang Yungyi was a pro-peace official. Even the state had 
relatively better economic and military condition in the reign of Taihe (1201-1208), 
he had already suggested the Jin court not to invade Song at that time because it was 
difficult to defend the occupied region in Huainan region as Song might block Huai 
River, which might block the supply route of Jin.
452
 Zhangzong partly agreed with 
his idea. Thus, after gaining military success Jurchen immediately terminated the war 
and renewed the peace settlement in 1207. However, Xuanzong did not accept his 
suggestions and continued the wars with Song. 
At the outset of the war with Song, Xu Gu already noticed that Song treated Jin 
Dynasty as barrier of Mongols invaders. He suggested seizing this opportunity to 
maintain peace with Song. He noticed Song did not dare to deeply invade Jin. He 
suggested Jin should build rapprochement with Song and attacks Song only if Song 
continued its provocation.
453
 Xu Gu’s argument reflected the contemporary situation 
of Song, probably his hometown was in Nanyang closed to Jin-Song border.
454
  Xu 
Gu commented that Jin should seize the opportunity when Mongols invaders took 
rest, to keep peace in southern Song, then Jin could enjoy peace soon. He referred to 
history that Jin enjoyed more than thirty years peace after Shizong and Zhangzong 
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signed peace settlement in 1165 and 1208. Jin benefited from the treaties to ensure 
the plenitude of the state for more than 30 years. Jurchen actively urged for ceasefire 
and gained huge success after peace was reached.
455
 He also analyzed by weighing 
the gain and loss of the state’s economy, and compared the situation with Southern 
Song. He said Song’s army stayed in the city, Jin’s army would gain nothing but used 
up the grains. Furthermore, Jin only had one province in Henan, and had to obtain 
the military funding by forcefully taxing people. He urged the emperor put all forces 
to be well prepared for Mongols’ attack, but not making another troubles at the 
back.
456
 Xu Gu clearly pointed the that Jin could not easily get the victory and it 
would risk the damage of economy through southern expedition. He also introduced 
some suggestions to strengthen the economy. Zhang Xinxin also pointed out the state 
should consider its economic situation before southern expedition.
457
 Although Jin 
accepted their suggestions to send envoy to Song to negotiate for peace, Song 
returned them in Huai border.
458
 
Some Jin generals also noticed Jin’s economic problem and attempted to maintain a 
better relation with Song. On the issue of punishment to Song’s illegal immigration, 
General Shujia Tuoluhui relieved their death penalty. He explained that after the state 
moved to Henan, the territory was smaller and commoners were poor. Fortunately 
the border region was peace, thus people can take a rest. If these bandits were 
executed, conflict in the border would be happened.
459
General Xu Ding also opposed 
the southern expedition. When he sent the armies from Qinzhou, Gongzhou and 
Fengxiang to attack Song, he still wrote a petition to emperor to oppose the invasion. 
He said that it was urgent to point out the interest of Jin Dynasty by not invading the 
south. He commented the peace with Song could strengthen the nation. Mongols 
invaders eliminated Jurchen’s armies power to one tenth and damaged lots of 
weapons. Commoners were exhausted by heavy labour work. Also the frequent 
transferring of armies affected Jin but not the enemy. Also, the Mongols might 
capture the opportunity to attack Jin. Moreover, he pointed out Song had been well 
prepared for military defence after their failure on northern expedition in 1208. 
Furthermore, when Jin Dynasty’s capital moved to Bianjing, it was closed to the 
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territory of Song. Song had well prepared as they treated it as threat. In addition, Jin 
would not gain any resources as Song already relocated the border residents to inland. 
460
 He also pointed out that the southern expedition might damage of economy and 
agricultural production led to crisis. He stated that that Song had long term hatred 
against Jin. They still did not forget to recover the old land and revenge for their 
shame, but they feared the Jin and failed to estimate Jin’s actual strength, thus they 
did not easily start a war with Jin. Even if Jin could win the war, if there were no 
storage, still it could not be defence. Fifth, the state might not gain additional grain 
through southern expedition because the wars already spent lots of labor forces for 
transportation. Also the heavy tax led to the fled of households, and they might turn 
into bandits. Sixth, farming activities would be affected. He suggested enhance the 
defence and military storage. The state should first self-strengthen and then recover 
the lost land, and Song could be conquered later.
461
 His argument had certain extents 
similar to the policy of Song which was focus on defence and strengthened the state 
only. Furthermore, Jin’s southern territory had potential to be developed if keeping 
peace with Song. In other section, we could see that after the war, Tangzhou and 
Dengzhou were destroyed and became lack of grains supply and commoners had to 
move to other region for grains, as censors predicted.  
 
C. Decision on Southern Expedition 
However, Gao Ruli, the Prime Minister, insisted to invade Song. He criticized Song 
was crafty and violated the regulation thus no room to negotiate with Song. 
Otherwise Jurchen would be slandered by them.
462
 Emperor accepted Gao Ruli and 
Shuhu Gaoqi’s idea and gave up the chance to negotiate with Song. 
Gao Ruli was a Prime Minister who is an expert to economic issues. During the reign 
of Zhangzong (1189-1206), he had been censor and transportation minister in Shanxi, 
Xijing, Beijing, Hebei and Zhongdu.
463
 He should have most of his knowledge on the 
economic situation in the Central Plain.
464
 He had been the envoy to Song in 1208.
465
 
He should have certain understanding on Song. However his respond on discussion 
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of relationship with Song shown that he did not make good use of his knowledge of 
economy. He was just based on patriotic sentiment, or obedient to Shuhu Gaoqi, but 
neglected the economic and political problems that Jin Dynasty was facing. The 
compilers of Jin Shi criticized Gao Ruli although he was an honest and careful 
official, he did not oppose the invasion and even banned the negotiation with 
Song.
466
 Gao’s stance on southern expedition was harmful to the state’s fate. 
 
Section 3 Jin Lost Heshuo During Southern Expedition 
 
In summer of 1217, Jin attacked Song because Song had attacked it several times and 
refused to pay tribute.
467
 The southern expedition lasted eight years until Jin sent an 
official letter to Song that Jin would not attack the South again in 1224.
468
 Although 
Jurchen gained some victory at the outset, it could not threaten the Song. Probably 
Jin’s armies aimed at plundering rather than attacking military strategic places. On 
the other hand, Song accepted Red Jacket Bandits and provisioned them. Thus 
Shandong gradually fell to bandits. 
 
Wars for Grains 
The economic factors largely explained Jurchen’s invasion against Song. After the 
war, Jin Shi stressed on recording the prizes captured through southern expedition. 
Just at the beginning of the war, Jurchen attacked Chenzhou (Gansu) and gained 
70,000 hu grains and 40,000 strings.
469
 Also, they captured Song’s granaries for 
9,000 piculs and 300,000 armours. In 1218, the army gained victory in Shouzhou, 
gaining 2000 piculs of grains.
470
 Shanxi gained greater victory, which captured 
90,000 hu grains, thousand millions of coins and large amount of army supplies.
471
 
Despite the military funding were provided by commoners, the spoils were 
distributed to soldiers.
472
 The state and commoners alike did not gain much. The 
small scale victory at the beginning might encourage the state to continue the war. 
Song’s official teased Jurchen for the reason that it was similar to a group of angry 
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bird travelling in forest, and the general leading the starving exiled refugees to 
fight.
473
 The practice by Jurchen’s army showed Jin was seriously lack of grains led 
to the expedition. 
However, the state did not have sufficient financial support led to military failure. 
The invasion spent large amount of money and undermined agricultural production. 
The military farm adopted by some generals could not cover up the expenditure.
474
 In 
1220, Wang Fu garrisoned in Qingzhou defected to Red Jacket Bandits due to the 
isolated of the city.
475
 General of Dongpingfu’s requested to send Henan’s army and 
Heshuo’s grains supply to recover Cangzhou, but rejected by the court.476In 1221, 
Jin’s army originally could approach Haozhou, but eventually returned due to the 
lack of grains.
477
  
 
Lack of Grains Supports to Warlords Led to Military Failure 
The state had long been failure to provide enough subsidizes to loyalists, caused the 
military failure. Zhang Kai requested to implement military farming in Hebei when 
the armies faced problems of deficient of grains, together requested 300 donkeys, but 
the court rejected, until Zhang Kai struggle for several times then received the 
permission.
478
 He requested 20,000 piculs grains from the state, but the state only 
supplied 10% to him. He was jealous to another warlord Wu Xian who received more 
subsidizes from the court.
479
 At the same time, another warlord Guo Minzheng 
garrisoned in Northwest border also lack of grains due to the barren of farmland in 
garrisoned region. The state ordered Zhang Kai to provide grains subsidise to Guo 
but rejected by Zhang. Guo failed and later Zhang also failed due to the isolate of 
power.
480
 The limitation of grains supply from the state led to the warlords failed to 
cooperate together to against enemies and eventually failed. 
Another warlord who failed due to deficient of grains and defected to Red Jacket 
Bandit was Wang Fu, Duke of Canghai. In 1220, Red Jacket Bandits and Song’s joint 
armies attacked Heshuo region. After combating a period of time, Wang Fu defected 
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due to the isolation of the city.
481
 After losing Qingzhou, the state refused General of 
Dongpingfu’s request to send Henan’s army and Heshuo’s grains supply to assist 
recovering Cangzhou,
482
where it was the important prefecture of Shandong having 
salt fields. The state just kept Henan.  
Jin Shi compiler commented that Jin had conquered China by military means, but 
also lost it in the same means.
483
 Despite the fact that the warlords were relatively 
strong, the lack of grains undermined their defence against Mongols. In addition, the 
struggling of the grains among warlords undermined the unity and cooperation of the 
loyalists, eventually they were eliminated one by one. 
 
Heshuo Loss after Southern Expedition 
Comparing with southern expedition during mid Jin Dynasty, now the Jurchen faced 
invasion from several enemies including Xi Xia, Song, Red Jacket Bandits and 
Mongols. Shujia Tuoluhui concluded the situation that Shanxi was being attacked by 
Mongols after Jin invaded the south, led to the frequent of war, the loss of soldiers, 
commoners suffered from intensive labor service. Also, Shouzhou and Sizhou were 
connected to the base of Red Jacket Bandit Xuyi and Chuzhou.
484
 Jin Shi commented 
that previously Jin had increased 100 square li of territory daily, but during the reign 
of Xuanzong, the state also lost 100 square li of territory daily, and eventually fall.
485
 
Thus, Jin’s military power was diverged, and the southern expedition was eventually 
loss. 
Also, one year after Jurchen’s southern expedition, the Mongols invaded Cizhou, 
which was 200 kilometers north of Nanjing.
 486
 Xuanzong was worried.
487
 In the 
spring of next year, Taiyuan had been lost in 1220.
488
 Zhending (Zhengding)’s 
General Wu Xian defected to Mongols.
 489
  Also, Tangzhou and Dengzhou were 
destroyed by Song’s army. In addition, the entire Shandong lost to Red Jacket 
Bandits in 1220. 
Just after relocation of capital, the increasing tax led to the raise of private security 
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groups and rebel the authority.
490
 Feng Bi suggested Jurchen should recover 
Shandong because there had strong horses and elites. Also there was large amount of 
grain production.
491
 In 1215, Jin’s army eliminated 30,000 armies led by Red Jacket 
Bandit’s head Yang An’er492 and killed Liu Erzu and his 10,000 army.493 Besieged by 
Jurchen armies, they lacked food supplies, even though they had “mountains of 
treasures”.494 In addition, Song, based on the treaty with Jin, rejected these bandits.495 
Thus, Red Jacket Bandits were isolated severely undermined.  
The situation changed after Jurchen southern expedition. When Jin was preparing to 
attack Song, Red Jacket Bandits launched attack on prefectures in Shandong.
496
 Song 
accepted Zhao Fang’s suggestion to attack Jin and accept the bandits.497 Song also 
accepted Jia She’s proposal to provide 10,000-20,000 subsidy quota to bandits. Thus 
they could survive and threaten Jin.
498
 Song also recruited bandits from Huai region.
 
499
 Song was rich in resources, they even increased the subsidy to encourage the 
bandits fight against Jurchen.
500
 Furthermore, these bandits contributed in relieving 
Song’s armies from Jurchen’s attack to establish military merit. 501  Li Quan also 
turned to Song.
502
 Jin’s General Wanyan Eke and Shi Quan invaded Song from 
Yinzhou and Shouzhou, originally they occupied several counties and gained some 
livestock. Due to the infiltration by Red Jacket Armies, Jin’s armies were totally 
defeated by Song.
 503
Song frequently rewarded them.
504
 Thus, Jurchen could not 
capture any cities through southern expedition. Also, Jurchen’s cavalry had 
approached Jiangkang. (Nanjing) but Li Quan and Song’s loyalist General Ji Xian 
attacked them back.
505
 On the other hand, Song captured entire Shandong with 2 
metropolitan prefectures, 9 prefectures and 40 counties through the contribution from 
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bandits in 1220.
506
 Thus, Cai Dongzhou’s comment that Jurchen lost Heshuo in 1225 
was incorrect.
507
 Later Wu Xian rebelled Mongol in 1225, but the city was conquered 
by Mongols again just after half year.
508
 It is clear that even Jin could obtain a 
defected metropolitan prefectures, it could not provision it. 
 
Termination of Sea Transportation Connecting Northeast 
The unrest in Shandong led to the suspension of sea transportation. Background 
chapter had described during mid Jin the state used sea route to transport the grains 
from northeast to Shandong and then to the capital. Upraise of Red Jacket Bandits 
occupied the sea route. Jin’s general commented that the sea route connecting 
northeast must pass through Enzhou and Bozhou.
509
 Toyama Gunji suggested that 
because Mongols armies occupied Shandong, thus Jin lost the connection to 
northeast through the sea route. Jurchen could not retreat to its origin.
510
 Herbert 
Franke suggested that Jin lost the horses supplies for cavalry forces.
511
 Jin Dynasty 
devoted considerable amount of efforts in recovering the coastal prefectures but 
failed. 
The problems of transportation also affected Korea paying tribute to Jin together with 
market trading. Korean used to have good relationship with Jurchen.
512
 In 1219, 
Korea planned to submit tribute to the Jin but without success because of the 
problem of transportation and the war.
513
 In 1218, the emperor especially pointed out 
the idea planned to reopen market with Korea, and urged the province to manage it 
despite the difficulty of the blockage of the route. He hoped to borrow grains and 
open the market with Korea, as Korea had long been used to submiting and paying 
tribute to the Jin.
514
 These sources reveal that the route to Northeast was blocked 
because of the unrest in the region.Thus there was a lack of connection to the Jin’s 
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territory in Manchuria. 
Since the Manchuria region was very important, but the loss of Zhongdu terminated 
the land route, and it was impossible for the state to recover Zhongdu, the recovery 
of sea route was a more possible option. In late 1210s, generals in Shandong 
attempted to recover the prefectures in order to connect northeast again.
515
 In 1222, 
Jurchen’s loyalist armies recovered some prefectures in Shandong, particularly Xinan 
which was 200 li away from the pier, the state attempted to use sea route to reconnect 
Liaodong, for access to northeast region.
516
 However, Jin Shi had no record on 
communication between the Central Plain and Manchuria later on, showed the 
transportation to northeast terminated. 
 
Section 4 Economic Loss Through Southern Expedition 
 
Through southern expedition, the victory of war could not benefit to the state but the 
lost led to serious consequences of the military and financial ability. It led to the loss 
of picked troops and created financial problems. Once Mongols armies attack, Jin’s 
army could not be defended.
517
 Officials pointed out the heavy tax and labor work in 
Henan after invading Song, and suggested to terminate the war to recover Heshuo, 
train the armies and increase the storage.
518
 Thus, the economic policy described in 
previous chapter could not boost up the development in Henan. 
 
Losing Shandong Salt Fields 
The loss of Shandong brought significant effect to the state. Jurchen originally had 
5,000 loyalist armies garrisoned there.
519
 In Dongping, there were more than 10,000 
soldiers, and used the salt produced in Binzhou to exchange for salt.
520
 Shandong 
General Hou Zhi used salt to exchange for grains and enhanced business activity, 
which could sustain the army without disturbing commoners.
521
 It showed the 
importance of Shandong’s salt field to support the loyalists. 
In the Table “Income of Salt Tax in Different Places” in Appendices, we can see that 
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Shandong and Cangzhou salt field yielded 4,334,184 strings and 2,766,636 strings 
respectively, which originally contributed to more than two-third of whole state’s salt 
tax income during peaceful era. It showed that there was significant income from the 
salt to the state. However, the entire Shandong lost to Red Jacket Bandits during 
southern expedition. The salt field also lost to bandits and strengthened their power. 
For example, rebelled General Zhang Lin garrisoned in Qingzhou with salt field, he 
owned six salt fields for profit. Wang Fu, another rebelled “loyalist” of Jurchen, 
rewarded by collect unlimited amount of salt profit.
522
 When Li Quan’s army passed 
through Cangzhou, salt were distributed to them as reward.
523
 Zhang Lin even 
submitted 200,000 strings to Song.
524
 It is clearly that the salt was valuable to sustain 
the army. 
 
Tangzhou and Dengzhou Destroyed 
The southern expedition led to the serious damage to Henan’s border region, 
particularly Tangzhou and Dengzhou several times during 1219-1220.
525
 It was due 
to Song’s strategy of relieve of besieged by besieging prefectures of Jurchen adopted 
by Zhao Fang. Song’s army did not aimed at deeply penetrating into Jin, but just 
seizure of the storage and destroying the defence of these cities.
526
 For example, 
when Jurchen armies attacking Qizhou and Huangzhou, Song’s General Zhao Fan 
besieged Tangzhou and Dengzhou, and pursued Jurchen when they retreated.
527
 
Meng Zongzheng, Hu Zaixing and Xu Guo also adopted similar strategy.
528
This 
strategy weakened the foundation of Jin, and Jurchen did not dare to attack 
Xiangyang, Zaoyang and Han.
529
 Thus, these regions’ population reduced and 
agricultural production affected. Lu Gan pointed out several hundred thousand 
soldiers garrisoned in border in the south. Most of residents living near the border 
regions in Tangzhou, Dengzhou, Shouzhou and Sizhou, as well as certain amount of 
soldiers fled, led to the reduction of population.
530
 Part of these populations fled to 
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Song.
531
 10 years later, Tangzhou and Dengzhou lost because of the deficient of 
grains in these regions. 
 
Trading with Song Terminated 
Treaties on Commodes emphasized the importance of the cross-border trading 
ground. Goods could be exchanged and the tax collected could be largely benefit for 
the state’s income.532 Shuozhou General Chu Bian pointed out previously he had 
proposed rapprochement with Song and established market for trading. Thus there 
was plenty supply of food for armies and commoners.
533
 
Since Jin-Song peace settlement signed in 1208, seven markets along border 
restored.
534
 The restoration of Yanzhou market in 1213 gained more than 100,000 
strings tax annually.
535
 However, these markets were finally closed during Jin’s 
invasion since 1217. Song seriously prohibited pirate activities to Jin. Also, they 
increase the price of tea and horses to inhibit Jurchen purchase.
536
 Lu Gan pointed 
out after the expedition, Sizhou’s market’s income lost several thousand bolts of 
cloths and several hundred taels of silver.
537
 The closure of these markets led to the 
loss of several hundred thousand strings of tax income.  Quan Hansheng suggested 
that during Northern Song era grain was transported from the south to the north 
through canals. During the Southern Song era, the Song court probibited supplying 
the grains to the north. The supplies of grain to Jin reduced.
538
 The ban of market and 
imposed river ban during Jin’s southern expedition affected the exchange of grains in 
southern boundary. That reduced the resources supplying to Henan. 
 
Jin Failed to Support Loyalist Army 
Song introduced Red Jacket Bandits to defend Jurchen’s attack. Jin also followed 
Song’s practice, and kindly treated loyalists with three times salary compared with 
ordinary armies. In 1219 when Jurchen was losing Shandong, the state provided 
military subsidy to loyalist army originally from Pizhou and Haizhou to organize a 
                                                 
531
 SS, 406, p. 12257. 
532
 JS, 50, p. 1113 
533
 Runan Yi Shi, 2, p. 22. 
534
 JS, 50, p. 1115 
535
 JS, 50, p. 1115 
536
 SS, 406, p. 12261. 
537
 JS , 50, p. 1115 
538
 Quan Hansheng, Smuggle Trading Between Song and Jin, Proceedings of Song, Khitan and 
Jurchen Social and Economic History, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: Song Man Book Store, 1973. Pp. 239-240. 
83 
 
team “victory army”. Every loyalist soldier received 30 mou of land; the strong one 
received 50 mou. They received two litre of grains daily subsidy.
539
 Originally there 
were only 1,000 loyalist soldiers, and the number of loyalist forces rapidly increased 
to 7,000 at the end of dynasty.
540
 The rapid increase of soldiers imposed burden upon 
the state, thus later the salary was reduced to the half.
541
 After the division of Red 
Jacket Bandits, despite Xuyi controlled by Red Jacket Bandits defected to Jin, Song 
court considered that Jurchen could not sustain the loyalist army.
542
  
During Jurchen’s southern expedition, Xuanzong was confused by Song people’s 
unwillingness to surrender to Jin while Jin people easily surrounded to Mongol.
543
 
The lack of resources was perhaps the answer. On the other hand, Song’s royal 
family donated 1,500,000 to reward armies.
544
 In the falling stage of Jin Dynasty, 
Guo Anyong, a defected general of Red Jacket Bandits and Mongols’ general,545 
returned to Song due to the lack of grains.
546
 Jin did not gain much achievement 
through keeping these loyalist army. 
 
Jurchen further lost its territory after southern expedition and destructed its fragile 
economy, but Xuanzong’s court just waiting Song to negotiate for peace, probably 
aimed at increasing the bargaining power. They did not know under the pressure of 
the public opinion in Song it was impossible to continue paying tribute to Jin again, 
particularly Jin no longer could threaten Song after losing entire Heshuo to bandits. 
Jin’s general Shujia Tuoluhui pointed out Song was hatred to Jin. It was not their 
original wills to be subordinate and respecting to Jin.
 547
 Until Aizong came to the 
throne, it adopted peace policy with Song. Thus there were another ten years of 
peaceful period with Song until Mongols invaders arrived Henan and then Song 
began to invade again.
548
 During that period, Red Jacket Bandits were divided, which 
consequently diverged Song and bandits’ attention. That allowed the Jurchen to 
recover slightly for the following few years. However, the state’s economy was so 
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fragile that it could not be strengthened to prepare for another military threat. 
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Chapter 4: Economic Crisis on the Eve of the Fall of Dynasty 
 
The failure of southern expedition led to the damage of southern part of Henan, 
together with the fled of households, seriously affected agricultural production. 
In addition, there was excessive soldiers defending Nanjing and relatives of 
military households receiving subsidy, led to the capital could not have enough 
grains storage. Once the Mongols surrounded the capital, the shortage of grains 
supply led to the fall of Nanjing rapidly. Also, the starvation situation led to 
Aizong made an unwise decision to flee to weak city Caizhou just because of 
grains supply. 
The compiler of Jin Shi commented that the fall of Jin dynasty related to economic 
problems, and Jin was even the worst compared to all the dynasties since Zhou 
Dynasty.
549
 Aizong, the last emperor of Jin Dynasty also concluded that after the 20 
years of relocation of capital, Henan’s people had sold their properties and wife, and 
put most of their effort to subsidize the armies.
550
 Generals and loyalists tried their 
efforts to prolong the rule of the state, but the lack of resources of the state eventually 
led to failure. Here will introduce the grain supply crisis of Nanjing city led to the 
relocate the capital to Caizhou and fall of Jurchen authority. 
 
Section 1 Lack of Grains Storage in the Capital 
 
The state garrisoned too much army led to the shortage of grains supply because 
of southern expedition. It could be shown in the policy of grains 
commandeering and the sharp rise of grains price.  The commandeering of 
grains and serious inflation showed the weak foundation of grains supply in 
Nanjing. It also showed the state did not have a good management on the 
income and storage of surplus for emergency usage after relocation of capital. 
The Mongols besieged Nanjing city was an examination to the economy of the 
late Jin Dynasty. 
 
Policies On Capturing Grains to Capital and Reduce Grains Expenditure 
There was increasing demand on grains in the capital after relocation of capital to 
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Nanjing. The commandeering the grains from private’s storage for military use led to 
the merchants did not sell the grains there.
551
 Shi Gaoyi had pointed out the storage 
of grains in Nanjing city was not sufficient as counting the storage of the government 
and the private, it was less than one percentage compared to the past of Zhongdu.
552
 
The state implemented several measures to invite wealthy people carrying grains to 
live Nanjing, at the same time drove away poverty people and reduced the soldiers 
garrisoned in capital to reduce the grains burden of the city. The state implemented 
the policy to ensure the net income of grains to the capital.  
Through migration policy, the state only allowed commoners to bring sufficient 
grains to move in Nanjing since 1216. The state assisted the transportation of grains 
and storage.
553
 In 1221, the fled households’ farmland in Henan was confiscated to 
provide for military households.
554
 In 1227, the state encouraged wealthy population 
to move into the capital and monitor the collection of autumn tax.
555
 Two years later, 
the state also allowed commoners to farm on the imperial hunting grounds around the 
capital which had size of 100 li.
556
 All the above measures showed the state tried to 
capture the grains and increase the production around the capital. 
 
Commandeering Grains in Nanjing 
After the Mongols started to besiege the city, the state started to commandeer the 
grains and also expelled dozens thousands of population out of the capital.
557
  
In 1232, after Jin failed to sign peace sentiment with Mongol, it recruited commoners 
to defend and confiscated the grains in Bianjing. The reason was some officials said 
there were 970,000 piculs storage of grains in the capital.
558
 Some suggested to 
commandeering the grains to obtain million piculs of grains.
559
 Wanyan Zhushe 
warned citizens that if there was lack of grains supply, then the family members 
would be executed and eaten up by military. One widow who had a son with a 
husband died, stored just three liters excessive amount of beans, was beaten to death 
and all the grains were confiscated. Other people discarded their grains to toilet after 
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knowing the news. Eventually less than 30,000 hu (or 15,000 piculs) grains were 
obtained.
560
 Both wealthy and poor people were all starved to death. Liu Qi stayed in 
Nanjing and witnessed the the siege of the city. Nanjing’s granaries were emptied 
and citizens were anxiety on the rumors. Every people were only allowed to store 
three pecks grains. The searching team was led by censor and General brought 
weapons to search everywhere in the house, including the ground. Royal family 
including emperor’s brother and imperial concubine did not have exception. There 
was no legitimacy of the state. Some of the rascals became spy for enemies. It was 
the sign of the fall of dynasty.
561
 The amount of grains commandeered was hundred 
times less than expected. The price was all residents and officials lived in the capital 
was suffered from starvation. 
Here will provide the amount of monthly consumption of the grains by every people. 
During the reign of Zhangzong, people consumed around 5 pecks of grains per 
month.
562
 These eight pecks grains could only provide commoners to withstand for 
just more than one or two months. It did not have enough support on the long term 
defense. People in the capital started to eat human being, and the state then allowed 
soldiers and commoners to move out the city for food.
563
 Also, the state ordered 
commoners to sell their grains to pay the military necessity tax of next year in 
advanced. Grain tax of upper households could replace for cash tax.
564
 In 1232, the 
state even reduced the amount of imperial armies. Hungry soldiers killed the gateman 
and fled out the city.
565
 Originally, lots of people brought the grains to the capital and 
the poor were driven out the city. However the high grains consumption in the capital 
seems used up the grains shortly.  After long term war with Mongols, there were still 
1.47 million populations in the city, including refugees.
566
 Just before the fall of the 
city, Nanjing had outbreak a large scale of plague, led to more than one million 
people died.
567
 It showed that during the fall of Nanjing, it had more than 2.5 million 
people including refugees stayed there. Assume that every people had eight pecks in 
their home. The 15,000 piculs grains commandeered showed every person only 
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responded 6 litre of grains to the state during the grains commandeering policy. After 
the plague, the state even doubled the tax from doctors, monks and coffin makers 
who gained profit through the plague.
568
 All the excessive resources were captured 
by the state. 
 
Serious Inflation 
The price of grains also reflected the shortage of grains supply. Liu Qi recorded 
the terrible situation of citizens suffered from starvation. 
 
Commoners consumed up all their grains. The price of grains rose sharply to 
two taels of silver. Poverty people had to eat dead body and they ate all the flesh 
part within one night, while officials used carts to transfer the grains out of city 
daily. Gentlemen and ladies had to beg on the street, some even ate their child. 
Valuable items like high silk clothes and classical tools could not even exchange 
several litres of rice. People worried they would be killed by hungry people thus 
they did not come back home late. Old friends and relative gathered together 
just for one meal. Furthermore, people killed their horses and cows, and even 
cooked the cages, saddles which made by leather to eat the skin. Everything 
which could eat was cooked. The woods in wealthy family and restaurants were 
all demolished for sell. The city turned into ruins, and the past flourish no longer 
existed. Officials fled to the north with their family, shown the state soon would 
be fallen soon.
569
 
 
During 1232 when the grains’ price rose to two taels of silver, people did not care the 
value of gold and silver to exchange for food. They sold their pearls and jades, 
dedicated decorations and clothes in Tianjin Bridge Market, just wanted to buy litre 
of rice or beans for emergency use. Liu Qi remembered his family used a very nice 
silk suit to exchange for 8 pecks rice. He also used a gold hairpin to exchange a 
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shoulder size of beef. He lamented the grains were more valuable than treasures and 
experienced old people idiom that firewood is Chinese cinnamon while rice is 
pearl.
570
 
We could compare the problem of inflation of the falling Northern Song’s capital 
faced the surrounding by Jin’s army 100 years ago.  Wang Zengyu quoted the 
northern Song’s San Chao Bei Meng Hui Bian and suggests that at the early stage 
when Dongjing (Kaifeng) was surrounded by Jin invaders, every peck of rice worth 
1,200 wen, wheat was 1,000. After half a year surrounded by Jin, the price of rice 
rose to 2,000 wen, while wheat increased to 2,400 per hu (5 pecks) .
571
 Referring to 
Gui Qian Zhi, the price was two taels, which was equivalent to four strings. The 
inflation was double than northern Song facing the same situation. 
 
Table 4: Serious Inflation of Grains in Nanjing in the Falling Jin Dynasty 
Year Price  Sources 
1232 2 taels per peck, 
or 4000 wen 
Rice sharply increased to 2 taels 
silver 米升直銀二兩 
Gui Qian Zhi, 
p. 127 
1233 10 teals platinum 
per peck 
10 teals platinum per peck 斗米白
金十兩 
Runan Yi Shi, 
p. 35 
1170 corns with hard 
surface:  120 per 
pecks 
Rice: 240 wen 
per pecks 
The price of flour is 210 wens per 
catty, grain with hard surface was 
120 per peck, corn’s price was 
double, and wheat was 60.面每斤
二百一十，粟穀每斗百二十，粟
米倍之，陌以六十 
Bei Xing Ri 
Lu， P. 266. 
1183 134 wen per 
peck (National 
price) 
Annual tax was 64,000 strings, 
equivalent to 86,000 piculs 有司上
其數，歲約給六萬四千餘貫， 
計折粟八萬六千餘石。 
JS, 47, p. 
1058.  
1127 Rice: 1200 per Rice 1200 per peck, wheat 1000 San Chao Bei 
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(Northern 
Song, 
when 
Bianjing 
was 
besieged) 
peck, 
Wheat: 1000 per 
peck 
 
per peck, donkey meat 1500 per 
catty, goat meat 4000 per catty, 
pork: 3000 per catty 雪雨不止，
物價日翔：米斗一千二百、麥斗
一千、驢肉. 一斤一千五百、羊
肉一斤四千、豬肉一斤三千，今
不復有也。 
Meng Hui 
Bian, 76. 
1127 
(Northern 
Song, 
after 
Bianjing 
was 
besieged 
for half 
year) 
Rice: 2000 per 
peck, 
Wheat: 480 per 
peck 
Rice 2000 per peck, wheat 2400 
per hu (5 peck), goat meat 7000 
per catty, pork 4000 per catty, 
donkey meat and fish 2500 per 
catty 
城被圍半年，至是斗米二千，斛
麥二千四百，羊肉一斤七千，豬
肉一斤四千，驢肉一斤二千五
百，魚亦如之。 
San Chao Bei 
Meng Hui 
Bian, 87. 
 
Through Liu Qi’s record of food supply in Nanjing after the city was surrounded by 
Mongols, it showed that there was a large number of people and insufficient food 
supplies. The situation was even more serious, compared with the Zhongdu. We can 
refer to Yuan Yi Tong Zhi to analyse the food produce and supply from neighbouring 
region. As previous chapter described, Dadu (Zhongdu) had large amount of grains 
production, also Baodi supplied poultry and seafood, the region around Kaifeng, 
which only produced pear.
572
 Bianjing Yi Ji Zhi quoted Song Shi Bi Duan Lun 
Bianjing Nan Shou that Bianjing was not a suitable place to be foundation of state, 
because it did not extraordinary in production.
573
 Although the grains production 
increased after the implementation of wet paddy field, the fall of southern Henan 
showed the deficient of grains. Therefore, despite residents in Nanjing was relatively 
wealthy with storage of lots of treasure, everyone still suffered from starvation, due 
to the lack of food supply. 
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Section 2 Jin Failed to Rapprochement and Song’s Counterattack 
 
The eight-year war with Song worsened the relationship with Song seriously. The 
ceasefire agreement with Song was reached in 1224,
574
 but it did not mean a full 
rapprochement with Song. Jin and Song did not send envoys to each other anymore. 
Jin’s envoy or representatives were returned by Song’s border generals. In addition, 
Song even did not trust Jin’s ceasefire agreement at the beginning, until Jin’s court 
continuously sent edict to the border region not to invade the south for ten years, then 
Song started to accept and prepare for rapprochement.
575
Jin’s generals had attempted 
to show their goodwill to Song to attack the rebelled Red Jacket Bandits together and 
not to accept the surrendered bandits,
576
 but Song rejected the request. 
After Jin Dynasty southern expedition ended, when Jin’s generals faced deficient of 
grains, they requested Song’s generals garrisoned along Xiangyang and Huai border 
to borrow grains, but all the Jin’s representatives was rejected by bordering generals. 
In 1231, when Jin noticed that the Mongols had bypassed Hebei and attacked from 
the west, the Jin originally invited Southern Song to jointly attack Mongol, and 
aimed at requesting grains subsidize. The communication problem worsened the 
build-up relationship with Song.
577
 Eventually, the cooperation with Song failed. In 
addition, after Aizong fled to Caizhou, Jin’s warlord Wu Xian moved to Dengzhou 
for grains.  When there was a shortage of grains in Dengzhou’s granaries, Wu Xian 
sent representatives to borrow grains from Song’s general Shi Songzhi. The poor 
communication of both sides not only led to the failure of grain procurement, but 
also undermined the relationship between Southern Song and Jin.
578
  
In 1233, Aizong was worried as he knew that Mongols’ envoy had visited Song.579 
Naizu Ahudai suggested the state should prevent Song and Mongols join together to 
attack Jin. Jin should make use of the opportunity to enhance the relationship with 
Song after the state fled to Caizhou, to request for military assistant, or borrow the 
grains, or at least not to assist Mongol to prevent being attacked in both sides. 
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Emperor Aizong sent him to Song, with message pointed out Song and Jin shared a 
common lot. Song subsidizing Jin was similar to protecting Song itself. Aizong’s 
argument was similar to Song’s official Qiao Xingjian stated in the court in 1214 and 
Hu Qu’s suggestion around twenty years ago. Jin suggested that Song should lend 
them one million piculs of grains.
580
 Song rejected the proposal, and soon started to 
respond Mongols’ request by attacking Tangzhou and later Caizhou. Tangzhou was 
fallen because of insufficient food shortage.
581
 Dengzhou also surrendered to 
Song.
582
 Actually if Song fulfilled Jin’s request, it could help Jin a lot. In Xiangyang, 
Song rejected Jin’s request but they provided ten thousand soldiers led by Meng 
Gong and Jiang Hai with three hundred thousand piculs of grains to assist its enemy 
Mongols.
583
 It strengthened the force to eliminate Jin. 
The joint attack from Song and Mongols attack to Nanjing and Caizhou was the 
worst situation to Jin. The reason was Song had advantage of war during spring and 
summer while Mongols had advantage during autumn and winter. Both of armies 
could take turns to take rest. Furthermore, Song provided grains support to Mongols 
helped Mongolian invaders had a long term surrounding the Jin Dynasty capital. As 
warned by officials before, Jin moved to Henan would increase the chance of conflict 
with Song, and there were no more way to retreat. 
 
Section 3 Relocating Caizhou For Grains and The Fall of Dynasty 
 
The lack of grains in Henan and the weak defence of the city also affected generals’ 
decision to save the capital. The agricultural activity in Henan was suspended, and 
there was no hope for reinforcement.
584
 Wu Xian originally was the strongest 
warlords at the beginning of conferring the nine Dukes.
585
 After Wu Xian returned 
back to Jin, he was still one of the strongest existing warlords in the late Jin. After Jin 
failed in the battle of Sanfengshan, the situation of Nanjing worsened. Despite Jin 
sent 15,000 soldiers to assist Wu Xian,
586
 Wu Xian refused to assist Jin to defend the 
capital as he was the most-wanted man of Mongols. He worried that during the 
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emergency of the state, he would be captured to send to Mongols.
587
 During the 
falling state in Caizhou, the state ordered warlord Wu Xian to defend the capital, but 
Wu Xian continued to reject due to the lack of grains and limited route there.
588
 It 
showed the lack of grains around the capital also affected loyalist armies to save the 
capital. Wu Xian’s worry was true because both Caizhou and Nanjing could not 
provide enough grains for the armies. Other generals either refused to assist or being 
defeated. Thus there was no more reinforcement went to Nanjing.
589
 
Aizong was frustrated that there were increasing enemies but the grains running 
out.
590
 He also disappointed that warlords did not assist the capital. In 1232, Aizong 
decided to flee to the regions having enough grains supply, without serious 
considering the long termed defensive ability. His bodyguards and the officials 
already suffered from long term starvation.
591
 The starving emperor, officials and 
soldiers decided to leave Kaifeng and fled to Caizhou for grains, despite there were 
lots of disadvantages to garrison at there. Caizhou’s general Wugulun Hao sent 400 
hu grains to Guidefu to invite the emperor to there, and the emperor accepted.
592
 400 
hu grains was just a insignificant number, compared with Song’s supply of million 
piculs of grains to Xiangyang when it was being besieged by Mongols dozen years 
later.
593
  Aizong’s decision to relocate to Caizhou reflected the serious shortage of 
grains in Henan. Jin attempted to recover two cities in Hebei due to the deficient of 
grains in Nanjing. However, the 60,000 armies were defeated by Mongols.
594
  
Caizhou was not a place excellent for military defend, as Guo Anyong, defected Red 
Jacket Bandit general immediately pointed out, together with the arguments that the 
difficult of grains supply if the city was surrounded by armies, and the close distance 
to Song would risk the loss of grains to enemy. Court officials rejected his opinion to 
relocate to Shandong.
595
 Guo also suggested the second choice for emperor to 
relocate to Guidefu. He pointed out Caizhou at that time had more food storage than 
Guidefu, but in long term Guidefu had substantial supply of fish and vegetable.
596
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However, Bai Hua commented the problems that grains would be consumed up in 
Guidefu
597
 In addition, General Wanyan Zhongde had suggested relocate to Qin and 
Gong region, as there were plenty of grains. Also, it could prepare for conquered 
Sichuan and Xingyuan. He had been prepared armies and cavalries for western 
expedition.
598
 However, Aizong and his bodyguards refused to move in order not to 
affect their family and business.
599
 Later, Song’s General Meng Gong blocked the 
road to Sichuan,
600
 the chance to fled to the west lost. 
Although Caizhou originally had more grains supply, soon Caizhou also faced food 
shortage problems after the city was surrounded by joint armies of Song and Mongol. 
Jin needed to reduce the excessive amount of officials and soldiers and the salary 
paid for them.
601
 All the officials under court officials, their monthly salary were 
reduced to only less than six pecks of grains. At the same time, the state confiscated 
city residents’ grains.602 The salary was merely enough for monthly consumption for 
one person, which was slightly lower than the maximum amount of allowed storage 
per person. The state issued new type of paper money, but eventually the state issued 
too much amount paper money devalued the currency after it was implemented for 
just more than one month.
603
 In 1233, Jurchen drove away the old and young citizens 
out the city.
604
 Also, the state implemented the Grains Commandeering Measures, 
that every adult could only store eight peck of grains while children aged ten allowed 
storing maximum of five peck. Death penalty implemented for illegal storage of 
excessive one litre grains. These officials dig the ground and removed the wall to 
search. There was huge amount of people who ignored the regulation and received 
penalty, and 25,000 piculs of grains was confiscated.
605
 It was just a repeat with 
previous practice in Zhongdu and Nanjing. Later, the shortage of grains was even 
more serious than Nanjing, with one peck of rice valued 10 taels of platinum. Hungry 
people resorted to cannibalism.
606
  It was a great contrast to Mongols’ invaders 
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having party to celebrate Chinese New Year outside Caizhou.
607
 On the eve of the 
fall of Jin, as revealed by Song Shi, Caizhou was lack of grains. Old and child were 
being eaten. Armies ate bones and grasses with muds. They were even extracted as 
“Human fueled Canons” for defense.608 Whole lost troops were executed due to the 
lack of grains, thus most of soldiers wanted to surrender.
609
 Eventually, under the 
strong attack from Song and Mongols’ joint army, Caizhou was fallen, and Jurchen 
was eliminated. 
Referring to the fall of dynasty, Yuan historian Yao Sui argued that the state 
confiscated grains to support the army to prolong its falling fate, to defend a growing 
power, created serious burden for people.
610
 It described the heavy tax and labor 
work, together with commandeering of grains reduced people’s willing to defend. 
They even preferred the Mongols to conquer the place as soon as possible in order to 
solve the grain crisis. It revealed that the worsening economy speeded up the 
collapse of the state. 
Caizhou was not a good defensive city, thus it was fallen under the strong attack by 
the joint armies from Song and Mongol. It was not a wise decision for Aizong to flee 
from Nanjing to Caizhou, however there was no alternative choices due to the lack of 
grains in Nanjing. As the fall of Jin Dynasty, the millions of starving soldiers and 
commoners relieved as they were pardoned by Mongols’ General Ashu and were 
allowed to migrate to cross the Yellow River to farm at the “paradise” for food.611 
The serious grain crisis could be shown in Song providing one million grains to 
Henan after they conquered the region. In the region, agricultural production “was 
abandoned” and people suffered from starvation.612 
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Conclusion 
 
As described by officials, the relocation of capital to Nanjing raised lots of 
problems. The mistakes in policy-making further significantly undermined the 
economy, shaken the foundation of the state. That largely explained the fall of  
Jin Dynasty. 
 
Mistake on Relocate the Capital to Henan 
Nanjing was convenient for transportation if the state was united between North and 
South. In terms of water transportation, Nanjing located the junction region. During 
the reign of Mingzong of Later Tang, General Shi Jintang had commented that 
Yimen (Kaifeng) was the important military strategic place.
613
 The geographical 
advantage of Bianliang also attracted Hailingwang to move the capital there. 
Hailingwang planned to construct and relocated to Bianjing, as a base to invade 
Southern Song to unify China.
614
 However, it was not a suitable place to defend 
invader’s attack. Prime Minister Zhang Xinxin pointed out that since five dynasties 
the dynasties setting the capital in Kaifeng just made use of Yellow River as natural 
barrier, but not for the purpose of military expedition. Northern Song had most of the 
Central Plains together with the whole regions of the southern part of rivers. 
However, Jin did not conquer the south, thus most of the canals travelling in north 
and south direction were useless. Thus the advantage of Kaifeng capital could not be 
well used. 
Also, the cost on keeping large amount of soldiers to defend the capital was 
excessively high. Although it had a constructed palace, the price was that the 
natural barrier was not as obvious as in Hezhong region. Thus the state had to 
garrison around several hundred thousand soldiers there. Eventually, the long 
term expenditure far outweighed the cost of constructing a palace. 
 
Western Region Offered Backup to Henan 
During the debate of relocation of capital, the emperor rejected relocating the 
capital to Hezhong. In fact, Hezhong closed to mountainous western region, the 
natural barrier was more useful. It could reduce the expenditure for keeping 
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large amount of soldiers.  
Shanxi was rich in grains production. It had exported large amount of grains to Song 
previously. Quan Hansheng referred to Song’s documents and described that Jin had 
exported the grains from Shanxi region to Song to exchange for 200,000 strings of 
coins in early Jin.
615
 It showed the sustainable grain supply in that region. In addition, 
after losing Heshuo region, Xiezhou salt field in Hezhong became the only existed 
salt field of the state until the end of Dynasty. Jin seriously protect this salt field,
616
to 
capture the income. Also, it would be an advantage for Jurchen armies to defend if 
any invaders attacked from downstream, that is in eastern side, as it had the 
advantages of look down from a height. Jin gained series of victory in its southern 
expedition in the western front during Taihe expedition (1207) to the southern 
expedition during Xuanzong.   
 
Weak Defence in Hezhong and the Loss of the Region 
Despite Hezhong was a military strategy region, the court ignored the defence 
there. Thus it was destroyed by Mongols’ invaders and the economy was hard to 
recover. 
In the winter of 1216, the Mongols occupied Tongguan, and later it captured 
Songzhou and Rujian. Censor Shi Gaoyi warned that the failure of wars along Yellow 
River was mainly the result of the state inactive response to Mongolian’s attack. 
Thus the enemy deeply penetrated into Jin’s territory. He pointed out that Jin had 
several hundred thousands of well-trained soldiers in the capital but none was 
deployed to defending the Mongols.
617
 Zhang Xingxin suggested the state should 
well manage Guanzhong (Shanxi) and Heshuo for future recover the lost territory 
and for self-strengthening. Otherwise, it would be difficult to defend Kaifeng.
618
 
Feng Bi also pointed out if Hezhong lost, then Henan and Shanxi would be in 
dangerous situation.
619
 However, Xuanzong sent a wicked general Wanyan Aludai to 
garrison in Hezhong region worsened the situation. Around 1216-1217, Aludai 
worried the attack from Mongolian invaders, he spent large amount of labour forces 
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to construct the wall but gave up the defence on Hezhong soon after Jiangzhou was 
fallen. Thus, Hezhong region was destroyed by Mongols’ attack. After Aizong 
succeeded the throne, there was a discussion on whether repair Hezhongfu. Some 
censors opposed because it was destroyed, and insufficient to defend it.
620
 The state 
accepted these scholars’. Furthermore, Aizong also passively defended Hezhong and 
Shanxi region, which refused to fight with Mongols.
621
 Thus after Mongol attacked 
from the west, Jurchen army was besieged in Henan. 
 
Confrontation with Xi Xia 
Furthermore, Xuanzong did not intend to terminate the war with Xi Xia, thus the 
armies could not focus on defending Mongols and eliminating bandits. The war 
started since 1213 until 1224,
622
 terminated eighty years peace between two states, 
led to the loss of packed troops of both states.
623
 During the war, Xi Xia had captured 
Huizhou.
624
 Up to several hundred thousands of soldiers were involved in the war.
625
 
Song joined Xi Xia’s army since 1219 after Jin’s southern expedition worsened the 
situation.
626
 Both side neither gain nor loss, but it created economic burden to the 
state.  For example, the recovery plan of Huizhou required 30,000 piculs of rice and 
9000 weighing unit of grass monthly, and not less than 100,000 labors to transport 
the materials. The amount would be further increased if the army could not conquer 
the city within the time. Also, Lintao circuit was emptied by bandits, affected 
agricultural production.
627
 Also, the termination of trading with Xi Xia affected the 
supply of horses. 
 
The Loss of Hezhong and Critical Condition of Henan 
In 1231, Mongol’s strong force with advanced war-ship equipped with canons, 
Hezhongfu eventually lost despite Jin’s general Wanyan Eke put most of the effort to 
defended for three months.
 628
As Hezhongfu lost, the Mongols immediately crossed 
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Yellow River through Heqing County.
629
 Jurchen lost its natural barrier which they 
relied on. Jin had mobilized large amount of soldiers to defend Mongols in the battle 
of Sanfengshan to resist Mongols’ attack but failed in result.630 Two months later 
Mongols’ reached Nanjing and started to besiege the city.631  Hezhong originally 
provided grains and protection to Nanjing. Once Hezhongfu loss, Nanjing became 
isolated and there was a shortage of grain within the city. 
On the other hand, parts of the garrison armies of Jin Dynasty strongly resisted 
Mongols armies, particularly in the western region. Sources recorded that after the 
fall of Jin Dynasty, the Mongols attacked the remaining prefectures, but twenty 
prefectures in Qinzhou and Gongzhou still could be defended.
632
 It showed that 
Shanxi still had enough resources to resist the enemies, while Nanjing lacked the 
necessary resources to defend. During the last year of Jin Dynasty, Aizong lost the 
opportunity to move to western region, thus the Jin court lost the chance to revive the 
state.  
Jin’s scholar Liu Qi commented that it was a mistake to move the capital to Kaifeng. 
If the Jin court had defended Guanzhong, it might extend the reign for several 
generations. Also the state did not prepare for revival, but survive just for the sake of 
several years after moved to Nanjing.
633
 The loss of Hezhong and Nanjing after 
sieges, thus, was directly the wrong choice of capital location and military strategy. 
 
Short Sighted Strategy of Southern Expedition 
After the relocation of capital, Jin-Song relationship deteriorated, and southern 
expedition was followed. Some historians suggests that it was related to the 
confrontation between Jurchen and Han ethnics. In fact, Jurchen’s southern 
expedition probably related to Shuhu Gaoqi’s acceptance of greedy civil 
servants’ opinion, while Song’s attitude was due to their long term hatred to 
Jurchen.   
 
Promotion of Wicked Civil Servants 
Jurchen’s decision on southern expedition was independent from ethnic problem. In 
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Jurchen court, Han and Jurchen’s status was similar, which was different from Qing 
Dynasty. (1636-1911) It was common that Han and Jurchen nominate each other 
without ethnic boundary.
634
 Also, it was not related to military and Confucianism. As 
analyzed before, there were some Han economic officials suggested to attack Song, 
while there were also some Jurchen generals against it. It showed in Jin Dynasty, the 
southern expedition was based on economic consideration. 
The southern expedition was directed by Shuhu Gaoqi. His policy to foreign state 
was highly related to his experience. He had successfully defeated Song in the 1207. 
On the other hand, he lost  in the war with the Mongols in 1213, and almost faced 
death penalty. His policy mainly gave up Heshuo region to prevent direct conflict 
with Mongols. At the same time, he thought that the state could defeat Song as 
previous, but did not know that Jin had used whole nation’s effort to attack Song 
during 1206-1207,
635
 while Jin’s army was distracted by Mongols, Xi Xia and Red 
Jacket Bandits. 
The policies also related to Shuhu Gaoqi preferred to promote civil servants instead 
of scholars. Lin Huangda analyzed the difference between scholars and civil servants 
in traditional China and pointed out civil servants were greedier and proposed short-
sighted plan.
636
 The southern expedition together with other economic policies 
showed these characteristics, aimed at gaining financial incomes in short time but 
ignored the long termed consequences, like the fled of households.  However, 
Xuanzong acceptance of the suggestions caused inevitable consequences. Compiler 
of Biographies of Jin Shi also commented that after relocation of capital, it was just a 
weak state. Shuhu Gaoqi preferred civil servants but hate scholars; he likes wars but 
not peace. The state was rapidly heading to fall.
637
 Shuhu Gaoqi was responsible for 
military issue, while Gao Ruli was for economy and promotion of officials. Both of 
them were corrupted and expelled the opposites. Furthermore, Shuhu Gaoqi’s pursuit 
of military power led to southern expedition. They did not planned to recover Hebei, 
but putting strong armies in Henan.
638
 Thus, it could explain Jin insisted to 
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implement southern expedition because of the selfish Prime Ministers. 
Zhao Yongcun commented that Jin should adopt a friendly policy to Song, including 
leaving the tributes temporary and even return some of the territory to Song in order 
to capture the support from Song.
639
 His suggestion was somehow idealistic. Song 
terminated the tributes already hurt the weakened economy of Jin. Also the limited 
territory of Jin after relocation of capital make the option “return some territory to 
Song” impossible. 
The possible option for Jin Dynasty was following Xu Ding and Xu Gu’s 
suggestion by keeping peace with Song to rapidly develop the prefectures 
closed to southern boundary to fight against Mongols. If Jin devoted more effort 
to developing these regions, it might provide plenty capitals and manpower for 
defending Mongols. Also Jin could benefit from the trading with Song to obtain 
more resources to fiancé the war and the state’s economy. 
Furthermore, the heavy taxation severely affected production. It was a dilemma 
for Jurchen commandeering farmlands from talents renting state owned land to 
distribute for military households or increase tax collected from talents to 
support for military households. Jurchen government chose to implement 
military farm, it affected large amount of peasants’ livelihood, large amount of 
commoners fled to Song or turned into bandits. 
We can compare the achievement of military farm in Song’s Xiangyang implemented 
in similar period. Shi Songzhi and Meng Zongzheng implemented military farm in 
Xiangyang and later Zaoyang since 1228. Meng accepted 10,000 refugees, providing 
them subsidy and farmland.
640
 Later he further recruited 20,000 Henan’s refugees.641 
His son Meng Gong’s military farm could yield 150,000 piculs annually.642 Under 
the policy, the accumulated grain production in these regions was 680,000 piculs.
643
 
Furthermore, Jurchen recruited Jin’s refugees as soldiers and implemented military 
farm to enhance military storage.
644
 Thus, when Xiangyang fell to Mongols, it still 
had 300,000 cash and grains.
645
After comparison, we can notice the low efficiency of 
implementation of military farm in Jurchen. It might be due to the loss of manpower 
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or the frequent of war with Song. Jurchen did not accept several censors’ opinion, 
and lost the chance to implement military farm in southern region of Henan. Thus, 
Jurchen lost due to the deficient of grains supply. It suggested that the Jin’s economic 
means and performance was far from satisfaction, particularly when comparing with 
its neighbouring nation, the Southern Song. 
 
Song’s Careful Foreign Policy by Prime Minister Shi Miyuan 
The court in Southern Song was dominated by conservative Shi Miyuan. Song was 
very alert to the political situation and changes of Jin Dynasty, because of the 
reference of political consequences after the failure of northern expedition in 1207. 
Song rejected envoys representing Genghis Khan’s invitation about jointly attack Jin 
in 1214
646
 and executed He Jiuling who attacked Jin arbitrarily. His body was ranged 
on the boundary in high tone.
647
 After Jin’s invasion, Shi Miyuan subsidized the 
bandits only in low profile.
648
 Li Tianming pointed out that Shi Miyuan refused to 
recruit loyalist army in high profile because he worried the failure would bear 
political responsibility. Song just used the loyalist army as barrier and wanted to keep 
a distance to them.
649
Thus, Song witnessed the weakening Jurchen and without 
concrete plan to eliminate it. In 1228, Song noticed the strong Mongol attacked Jin, 
but it only strengthened the defense in the border region.
650
 At the very end which Jin 
was nearly eliminated in 1234, the court in Southern Song still did not have intention 
to eliminate Jin, probably due to the strong enemy Mongol was behind Jin.  
In the dominant opinion in Song’s court, after Hu Qu proposed to negotiate with Jin 
rejected, there were no more suggestions on supporting Jin.
651
 In addition, most of 
Song’s generals were against negotiation with Jin. Song’s General Meng Gong, who 
had contributed a lot on eliminating Jin in 1230s. In fact, his father had been captured 
by Jurchen during Jin’s southern expedition in late 1210s.652 It may lead to his hatred 
to Jurchen. Actually, in 1232, just before the fall of Jin, Song was shocked by 
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Mongol’s invasion to Sichuan region. 653  Just after Shi Miyuan died, Lizong 
immediately held discussion on the important political issue with Zhao Fan and Zhao 
Kui, particularly on the border issue. They urged the state to remember the history of 
signing settlement with Jurchen in 1120.
654
 Through their conversation, they still 
remember the fall of Northern Song after uniting Jurchen to eliminate Khitan. Lizong 
accepted Zhao’s suggestion to strengthen the force first and later revenge the Shame 
of Jinkang.
655
 Although Zhao’s family strongly against negotiation with Jurchen 
before, their attitude changed. It was probably due to their notice on stronger 
Mongols through elimination of Red Jacket Bandits. Zhao previously had accepted 
Jurchen’s negotiation after the failure of rebellion of Red Jacket Bandits.656 Richard 
Davis explained in his book Court and Family in Sung China 960-1279, “his (Shi 
Mi-yuan) insistence that the south not intervene in the expanding Mongol-Jurchen 
conflict to the north. For the most part, the court was not inclined to depart from this 
general principle. Not until his very last year in power-by which time Cheng Ch’ing-
chih had already assumed many of Shih Mi-yuan’s former responsibilities as chief 
councilor-did there occur the necessary adjustments to effect a Sung-Mongol alliance 
against the Jurchen.” 657  Thus, Song’s court carefully handled its relations with 
Jurchen, and there was no large scale expedition against Jurchen. In 1233-1234, only 
Meng Gong’s 15,000 armies sent to eliminate Jin, but Jin was too weak and fallen. 
 
Raise of Bandits Due to Economic Problems  
Southern expedition and raise of bandits was interrelated. Jurchen official pointed out 
Song and Jurchen were enemy for several generations. Song did not forget to recover 
the lost land, thus Jurchen had to aware Song subsidize the bandits.
658
 It revealed that 
Jurchen worried Song’s patriotism led to the instability of border region. 
Historians used to point out the confrontation between Jurchen and Song related to 
ethnic conflict. Li Tianming pointed out the raise of bandits was due to their 100 
years hatred to Jurchen.
659
 Huang Kuanchong suggested that people in the Central 
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Plains think of Song, under the depression from Jurchen and their hometown was 
demolished through wars, then they escaped into countryside and rebelled.
660
 He also 
quoted that Li Quan “preferred to be ghost in Jiang Huai rather being Jurchen’s 
official.”661 Their research showed commoners in Shandong had strong anti-Jurchen 
sentiment. After relocation of capital, Jurchen did not recover the prefectures 
destroyed by Mongols, but Jurchen’s suppress to the bandits affected commoners. 
Jurchen General Tian Zuo garrisoned in Heshuo collected too much from commoners, 
thus people hated Jurchen’s authority.662 On the other hand, another official in Zizhou 
(Zibo) collected tax under regulation, thus bandits could not expend in that region.
663
 
Shandong turned poverty after Mongols’ attack, but Jurchen increased intensity to 
collect from public, thus commoners turned into bandits. 
Huang also acknowledged that the rebellion force conducted business activity, and 
strengthened their power through pirate activity.
664
 These bandits rebelled did not for 
the sake of Han ethnic, but just for their own interest. For example, Li Quan in fact 
benefited from pirate activity through controlling Shandong region.
665
 Also, after the 
division of bandits, Xia Quan, Wang Yishen, Fang Chengjin, head of bandits defected 
to Jin. Li Quan also planned to negotiate with Jurchen.
666
 Jurchen officials also 
noticed Li Quan was crafty that bullying Song by flaunting Mongols’ power.667 In 
fact he had intention to defect to Jin.
668
 Thus, these bandits just based on poverty and 
damage of Shandong, and called on people to join the rebellion force to against 
Jurchen, and to lobby for subsidy from Song with the title of “loyalist”. In fact they 
were just taking economic advantages through the chaotic situation between 
Mongols, Jurchen and Song. Huang stated the rebellion of bandits led to the fall of 
Jurchen authority.
669
 It’s true that the bandits occupied Shandong, and assisted Song 
to defend Jurchen attack. Thus, Jurchen’s southern expedition failed. Later the 
collapse of bandits led to the Mongols to take over the region, providing an alternate 
route for them to approach Henan. 
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Lack of Horses to Suppress Bandits 
The lack of war horses also undermined the military power. It was due to the 
loss of horse’s breeding ground and import from Xi Xia. 
Heshuo and Manchuria were the breeding ground of war horses. Horses were bred in 
Heshuo region, including Hebei, Zhongdu and Xijing,
670
 but not in the southern 
region. The state had to offer large amount of cash to buy the horses from 
commoners.
671
 Song also increased the price of horses to limit Jurchen purchase 
horses after southern expedition.
672
 The limited supply of horses reduced the power 
of cavalry and limited the power to suppress bandits. Tao Jing-shen pointed out Jin 
could not suppress the bandits because of lack of horses supply and thus there was no 
cavalry.
673
 Sun Jiangquan’s stated the sources of horses from Hebei and trading with 
Xi Xia, thus there was crisis on supplying horses for cavalry.
674
  The loss of horses 
supply explained why Jurchen could not field much cavalry in Shandong. Jin had 
mobilized most of the cavalry to defend the capital and Shanxi.
675
 Some were put in 
the battlefield against Mongols. Thus, Jurchen’s loss of the supply of cavalry 
explained the revival of Red Jacket Bandits. 
 
Xuanzong failed to Revival the State 
Xuanzong aimed to revive the state and extending the achievement of mid Jin 
Dynasty. The compiler of biographies of three censors commented that when 
Xuanzong succeeded the throne, he planned to revive the state so that it could be as 
strong as it was during the reign of Shizong (1161-1189). But his actions did not fit 
his lofty words.. The southern expedition during the reign of Zhenyou led to a 
massive loss of life. The Censors Xu Gu, Wanyan Sulan and Chen Gui all pointed out 
the problems. Xuanzong knew they were loyal but rejected their opinion. Thus it was 
difficult to revive the state similar to Shizong.
676
 Xuanzong adopted similar 
economic policies compared with Zhangzong, including the southern expedition, and 
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the increase of tax. However, most policies were poorly executed and administered, 
and eventually deteriorated overall governance. Xuanzong lamented that Shuhu 
Gaoqi and Tuanduo damaged the interest of the states, and was arrested with remorse 
in his later life.
677
 Both of them were punished, eventually, but the eight years of 
ruling by these two wicked officials meant losing the opportunity to recover. In its 
southern expedition, the court of Xuanzong acted like a mad gambler. At first, the 
Jurchens did gain a few victories here and there in their southern expedition. But as 
the war progressed, they continued their campaign even as the supplies were reduced, 
in the hope that a larger victory would allow them to demand more favourable terms 
at the negotiation. Yet, they even refused to terminate the war when they lost Heshuo 
region to the Red Jacket Bandits. Eventually, the fleeing of households destroyed the 
remaining economic foundation of Jin Dynasty. 
After relocation of capital, Jurchen suffered a server lack of resources. 
Xuanzong intended to solve it through the southern expedition, but the 
expedition itself was already beyond the resources capacity of the Jin to support.  
The fleeing of households and loss of Heshuo and Shandong fundamentally 
undermined the state’s strength. The Jurchen. by then, not only had lost the 
ability to recover lost territory, but also no longer had the means to support its 
army for defense purposes. 
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Appendices 
 
Table 5: Flooding in Rivers since 1163 (Recorded in Treatise of Rivers and 
Canals) 
 
Year River Region Effects 
1168 Yellow River Ligudu 李 固 渡 , 
Anyang 
Affecting Caozhou and 
Danzhou in Shandong, court 
send Water minister Liang 
Shu to seek for solution. 
Ligudu constructed a dam 
Hutuo River 滹沱
河 
Zhengding 真定 Spent twenty-eight thousand 
labor to repair the dam 
1171 Yellow River Wangcun 王 村 
Xingyang 滎陽 
Affected Henan’s Mengzhou 
and Weizhou 
1177 Yellow River Baigou, Hebei Used 11500 manpower daily 
to spend 60 days to repair 
the dam 
Hutuo River Baimagang Spent 500 labor to repair 
1180 Yellow River Weizhou and 
Jingdong dam in 
Yanjing 
Affected Guide. Spend 
24000 manpower working 
70 days to construct a dam 
from Weizhou to Guide. Tax 
was exempted in that year 
1181 Yellow River NIL River flowed in new path 
1185 Lugou River Xiangtongzhai and 
Shangyangcun 
Ordered the labors located 
300 li around Zhongdu to 
repair, but suspended after it 
flooded again 
1186 Yellow River Weizhou Damaged the dam in 
Weizhou and destroyed the 
city. Later affected Daming 
fu 
1189 Yellow River Caozhou Used six million and eighty 
thousand work unit to 
construct dam. Four million 
and three hundred thousand 
of them are commoner’s 
labor, others are military 
manpower. Each work unit 
paying one hundred and fifty 
wen. The daily expenditure 
for official’s salary was fifty 
108 
 
wen with half litter of rice
678
 
1189 Lugou River  Divert the river 
1191 Lugou River and 
Zhang River 
 Two Years later, spend three 
hundred and eighty thousand 
work unit to repair the dam, 
recruit the refugee as labor 
1194 Yellow River Yangwu, Hebei Affected Fengqiu 
    
 
Source: Jin Shi, Chapter 27, pp. 669-688. 
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Table 6: Serious Flooding in Henan 
 
Year Region Effects 
1171 Wangcun 王
村  Xingyang 
滎陽, Henan 
Affected Henan’s Mengzhou and Weizhou 
1216 Sizhou, 
Henan 
Lots of people die along the road. People only eating grass 
root and tree bark
679
 
1220 Henan Half of households fled, led to farmlands uncultivated, affect 
the government’s income. Government exempted tax and 
encourage farming
680
 
 
Source: Jin Shi, Chapter 23, pp. 537-545. 
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Table 7: Changes of Official Price of Salt Produced in Different Regions 
 
Salt Production 
Regions 
Price (per piculs, or 120 
catty) 
New Price in 1199 (per 
piculs, or 120 catty) 
Increased % 
Shandong, Baodi 
and Cangzhou 
3 strings and 600 wen# 5 strings and 160 wen 43 
Xiezhou 5 strings* 6 strings 400 wen* 28 
Liaodong 900 wen 1 string and 500 wen 67 
Beijing 900 wen 1 string and 500 wen 67 
Xijing 2 strings 2 strings 800 wen 40 
Mixed salt 撈鹽 1 string 500 wen 2 strings 33 
    
*The weight unit is 1 xi, with 116 catty 
# It was calculated by the price in 1189, that the salt selling 30 wen per catty 
 
Source: Jin Shi, 49, pp. 1100-1101. 
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Table 8: Income of Salt Tax in Different Places 
 Previous Tax Income New Tax Income (since 
1199) 
Increased 
% 
Shandong 2,547,336 strings 4,334,184 strings 70.1 
Cangzhou 1,531,200 strings 2,766,636 strings 80.7 
Baodi 887,558 strings 600 wen 1,348,839 strings 52.0 
Xiezhou 814,657 strings 1,321,520 strings 256 wen 62.2 
Liaodong 131,572 strings 800 wen 376,970 strings 256 wen 186.5 
Beijing 213,892 strings 500 wen 346,151 strings 617 wen 2 
fen 
61.8 
Xijing 100,419 strings 696 wen 280,264 strings 608 wen 179.1 
Total 6,226,636 strings 566 
wen 
10,774,512 strings 137 wen 73.0 
 
Source: Jin Shi, 49, p. 1101 
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Conversion of Measurements 
 
 
 
 
Weight 
Picul 石= 31 kg 
Hu 斛=15.5 kg 
Peck 斗 =3.1 kg 
Litre 升 =310g 
Catty 斤 =258.24g 
 
Cash 
Taels 兩 =2 strings 
String 貫 =1000 wen 
Wen 文 
 
Area 
Qing 頃 =100 mu 
Mu 畝=666.66 m2 
 
Sources: Endymion Porter Wilkinson, Chinese History: A Manual, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2000. 
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